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After The Gold Rush-Part I: Hamdi, 9/11,
and the Dark Side of the Enlightenment
Daniel R. Williams*
We construct meaning in our normative world by using.., the
surreal epistemology of due process.
Robert M. Cover'
Make no mistake, the normative authority of the United States of
America lies in ruins.
Jirgen Habermas

2

I was thinking about what a friend had said/I was hoping it was a lie.
Neil Young

3

We are a nation gripped by a perennial gold rush, perforating the
sacredness of the mountain ranges, forests, and running water that
conceal the gold; stricken with a blindness more like an impediment
within our Western mind that transforms every mystery into a problem,
every unknown into a future solution, every barrier into an opportunity
for riches. Understanding this gold-rush mentality opens up how
profoundly illuminating it is to contrast our blas& attitude towards the
looting and destruction of priceless cultural and historical artifacts in
Baghdad soon after the bombing stopped in 2003 and our rigorous and
adamantine efforts to secure the Iraqi oil fields.
We have long had a gold-rush foreign policy, where "the chief
American interest in the world [is] access to the world,"4 where "[o]ur
* Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. I am
grateful to my colleagues at Northeastern University School of Law who provided helpful
feedback during a faculty colloquium. Special thanks to Dan Givelber. I also wish to
acknowledge the helpfulness of my exchanges with Michael Hatfield and Anders Kay.
1. Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-9

(1983) [hereinafter Cover, Forward].
2.
3.
4.

JORGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 29 (2006).
Neil Young, After the GoldRush, on AFTER THE GOLD RUSH (Reprise 1970).
MORRIS BERMAN, DARK AGES AMERICA: THE FINAL PHASE OF EMPIRE
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real task ... is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to
maintain [a] position of disparity" in which "we have about 50 [percent]
of the world's wealth but only 6.3 [percent] of its population,, 5 where (as
the Bush Administration war planners describe it in the September 2002
document known simply as the "National Security Strategy") the
freedom to buy and sell in a global marketplace managed by a single
global hegemon (America) is at the heart of our national security
strategy. 6 Our gold-rush foreign policy dictates that commercial
openness, economic integration, and technological innovation within an
American-managed global system is to be enforced by our
unchallengeable military might.7
This article, the first in a two-part series, offers the view that Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 8 a case approving of the Executive's detention of so-called
enemy combatants, is ensconced within this gold-rush mentality, that
Hamdi is thus nominally about enemy combatants and the "war on
terror," and that our judiciary, the crucial guardian of our system of
rights within a seriously damaged democratic culture, ignores how
institutional, cultural, and ideological forces that have produced the need
for a case like Hamdi threaten to doom our commitment to a concept of

(2006).
5. George Kennan, PPS/23: Review of Current Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy, I
Foreign Relations of the United States 509-29 (1948), available at www.geocities.com/
Athens/Forum/2496/future/kennan/pps23.html. Kennan's report is the foundation to
NSC 68-the framework document for U.S. foreign policy throughout the post-War
period.
6. See OFFICE OF WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 18 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nss.pdf. The National Security Strategy trumpets free enterprise as essential to the
"single sustainable model for national success." Id. at iii. For two excellent accounts of
the consumerist underpinnings to U.S. foreign policy, see ANDREW J. BACEVICH,
AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY (2002) and
BENJAMIN BARBER, FEAR'S EMPIRE: WAR, TERRORISM, AND DEMOCRACY 17 (2003)
("[America] thinks privatized markets and aggressive consumerism freed of democratic
constraints are what it means to forge democracy"). See also JONATHAN SCHELL, THE
UNCONQUERABLE WORLD: POWER, NONVIOLENCE, AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 36
(2003) ("An unbroken thread of faith in free trade as an abettor of peace runs through the
entire tradition of liberal internationalism, surviving many disappointments and
continuing, if in attenuated form, to this day.").
7.

See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN

THE AGE OF EMPIRE 3-93 (2004); BARBER, supra note 6, at 35-36 ("Pax Americana, like
the imperial Roman hegemony (Pax Romana) on which it models itself, envisions global
comity imposed on the world by unilateral American military force .. "); CHALMERS
JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END OF THE

REPUBLIC 285 (2004) ("In the wake of the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001,
President Bush declared that our policy would be dominate the world through absolute
military superiority and to wage preventive war against any possible competitor.").
8. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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liberty long regarded as sacred within our Enlightenment heritage. 9 It
flips conventional thinking, repudiating the notion (whatever its flaws)
that Guantanamo-style detention serves the so-called war on terror and
substituting it with its converse: the war on terror-indeed, the terrible
episode of 9/11-serves Guantanamo, a term I use to capture a certain
mindset about the sovereign's power to detain and use violence to
accomplish geo-political ambitions which I argue emanate from a goldrush mentality, which in turn emanates from a dark side of our
Enlightenment ambitions that run deep in our culture.
This article takes seriously the question posed by Slavoj Zizek:
"What if the true purpose of the war [on terror] is to pass to a global
emergency state?" 10 How might the Court have approached the legal
controversy in Hamdi if we were a nation willing to confront that
question, which entails being open to facts about our pursuit of empire,
which is to say, facts about our past and present ambitions in
constructing and enforcing a geopolitical order congenial to a particular
form of global economic integration that best promotes American
corporate interests?" Might the Court have seen that Hamdi (and the
9. Regarding the proposition that the judiciary is the only viable guardian of our
rights, see David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual
Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2592 (2003) ("Only the courts have
an obligation to entertain claims of rights violations.").
10. Rebecca Mead, The Marx Brother: How a Philosopherfrom Slovenia Became an
International Star, THE NEW YORKER, May 3, 2003 at 38, available at
http://www.lacan.com//ziny.htm.
11. For an indispensable examination of America's quest for empire, see generally
SIDNEY LENS, THE FORGING OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO

VIETNAM: A HISTORY OF U.S. IMPERIALISM

(2d ed., Haymarket Books 2004). Americans

are squeamish about the term empire when describing our own nation and its policies, in
large part (I suspect) because it is too wrapped up with notions of colonialism and
imperialism. Racism, too. Government officials, though, speak openly about our being
an empire. See IAIN BOAL, T.J. CLARK, JOSEPH MATTHEWS, AND MICHAEL WATrS,
AFFLICTED POWERS: CAPITAL AND SPECTACLE IN A NEW AGE OF WAR 195-96 (2006)
(quoting a Bush advisor saying that: "We are an empire now, and when we act, we create
our own reality."). And so do conservative scholars-for decades, in fact. See MORTON
A. KAPLAN, DISSENT AND THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR: AN ESSAY ON THE GROUNDS OF
PUBLIC MORALITY 159 (1970) ("Although on first sight the goal of an American empire
will seem strange or even wrong, there is in the universalistic American value scheme
something that might drive us to create a world-wide empire that is nonimperialistic and
democratic."). As of late, even a liberal scholar such as Michael Ignatieff speaks openly
about America as an imperial empire, and a worthy one at that. Michael Ignatieff, The
Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 24. See also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF,
THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2004). I use the concept of
empire to capture the undeniable quest of the United States to construct and maintain a
global order that is congenial to its own perceived economic interests. The terms
"colonialism" and "imperialism" are outmoded and, because of the baggage they carry,
unhelpful in our globalization age, where a "'network power,' a new form of sovereignty,
is now emerging... [which] includes as its primary elements, or nodes, the dominant
nation-states along with supranational institutions, major capitalist corporations, and
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other post-9/1 1 war-on-terror cases) invites us to confront what is
probably the most crucial global issue for this nation at this early stage of
the twenty-first century: shall we, as a nation, seize the opportunity
presented by the end of the Cold War to forge and solidify a global ruleof-law system that provides for collective security and the genuine
renunciation of military aggression? It is that question that percolates
beneath the surface of Hamdi, as the Justices preoccupy themselves with
the legal issue of what prerogatives, what constitutional and legislatively
granted powers, the Executive has at its disposal to fight the so-called
war on terror.
This article, then, treats the Hamdi opinion as a legal document
infused with cultural significance, which means that it confronts the
Court's reasoning not from the point of view of logic or stare decisis, but
from the proposition that human striving-and "law" is nothing more
than a facet of human striving-is more about desire and fantasy than it
is about rationality. What follows in this exploration of Hamdi is thus
not so much concerned with what is "fair"-that is, with answering the
question, does Hamdi provide for a "fair" process before one may be
detained?-but with what is hidden and revealed, with investigating
Hamdi's meaning within our culture, with what it reveals and portends in
a society that, in my view, has slid so precariously into the dark side of
the Enlightenment.
Dark side? The current struggle against "terrorism" is, we are told
through manifold organs of our culture, a war against those who "hate
our freedoms," who are dedicated to destroying our way of life in a
democratic culture, who want to bring the world back to a darker time
when blind submission to authority trumps reason.' 2 The war against
terrorism, when rhetorically decoded, is packaged as a fight against the
dark side, a fight to preserve our Enlightenment heritage by averting the
onset of a new dark age. Do we, then, respond by bracketing as an
extravagance that we can ill-afford in this defense of Enlightenment the
primary institutional mechanism for detaining dangerous and destructive
persons, the trial by jury, which is itself the quintessential vitalizing
expression of our Enlightenment heritage? What is signified by doing
so? More provocatively, ought we accept the premise that a new dark
age is what threatens us, that it is darkness from another source that we
must avert? Or is the situation considerably more complicated and
disturbing, a situation reminiscent of the early years at the dawn of

other powers." HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at xii. See also id. at 7.
12. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congressand
the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
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another new century, the twentieth?' 3 That is to say, are we faced with a
dark age that has already descended upon us, we bearers of the
Enlightenment torch?
This article aims to explore these questions in two steps. Part one
examines what Hamdi v. Rumsfeld says on the surface-its visible side,
so to speak-in order to highlight what might be called the Court's
"process jurisprudence" when it comes to juridifying the war-on-terror.
This phase of the discussion culminates in a thought experiment couched
as a doctrinal proposal, a proposal I label the "clean-hands doctrine."
This clean-hands doctrine demands that the Executive establish its
compliance with international law in deploying military force before it
may bypass fundamental adjudicatory rights contained within the
Constitution's bill of rights. This doctrinal proposal would never see the
light of day-and that is precisely the point. Understanding why the
Court would never insist upon Executive clean hands before allowing
Guantanamo-style detentions illuminates how deeply we Americans are
gripped by a mythological and dangerous exceptionalism, an 14American
exceptionalism that poses special dangers in this post-9/1 1 era.
13. Few believed that the outbreak of war in 1914 would lead to the protracted
barbarism that the world witnessed, utterly aghast but powerless to stop. The very things
that fueled that global conflagration of violence-science, democracy, capitalism, and
industrial development-were regarded not as dark forces, but as "motors of human
progress." SCHELL, supra note 6, at 43. People regarded those "forces," Schell argues, as
marks of the "advance of civilization, not its downfall." Id. Hannah Arendt's study of
totalitarianism is evocative and parallel to what I aim to articulate in this article as well.
She argued, in essence, that the true crisis of the twentieth century was not the threat of
totalitarianism; that threat was more epiphenomenal. The true crisis-imperialism (a
manifestation of the Enlightenment drive to control and dominate) -would reveal itself
most clearly only with the defeat of totalitarianism. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS
So, too, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
OF TOTALITARIANISM (1958).
ending of the Cold War. Communism was never the true threat; the ending of the Cold
War has revealed the true crisis of our time, the inexorable spread of a consumerist
globalized economic world order-a digitalized imperialism, if you will-that suffocates
competing socio-economic systems, ensnaring all cultures and traditions in a global
system of winners and losers.
14. No doubt some may criticize my use of the term "American exceptionalism" as
"too loose[] and without meaningful nuance." Harold Hongju Koh, On American
Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1482 (2003). There are times when linguistic
refinements serve useful ends. But too often, in my view, when it comes to examining
our own country's actions in the foreign policy arena, refinements in what we mean by
"American exceptionalism" serve only to support an apologia for military aggression or
to make self-serving claims about our pursuit of democracy abroad. Nonetheless, there
are indeed many ways in which the term is used. I use it to capture the multiple ways in
which we understand "America" as a normative concept, and thus standing above
accepted criteria of decency that we routinely deploy in judging other nations. Whatever
subcategories of "American exceptionalism" we might want to create, I take it as an
undeniable fact that our insistence in understanding "America" as a normative concept is
what drives our foreign policy and our use of military force in pursuing that policy, just
as it propelled us westward, with the attendant slaughter of Native Americans and our
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Part Two presents a textual probe of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, distancing
ourselves from it as a legal opinion so as to appreciate its narrative
ambitions and rhetorical strategies.
This narrative probe, loosely
inspired by Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative and Anthony
Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner's Minding the Law, pursues the thesis
that Guantanamo-style detention exists not in the service of the so-called
war on terror, but rather that the "war on terror" serves Guantanamo,
fueling and nourishing it. Guantanamo-style detention does not exist
because of the war on terror; the war on terror exists because of the
suitability of Guantanamo in this post-Cold War age of globalization. It
pursues this thesis by probing the issue of American exceptionalism with
the hope of better understanding the meaning behind "9/11" and our
global identity as a nation. This understanding should remind us once
again of what is both obvious and too often forgotten: law is not merely a
labyrinth of rules, nor is it just a discursive practice by and through
which power is allocated; it is a way to inscribe consequences upon real
human beings. This reminder is important, as we must acknowledge the
fact that we are moving deeper, and rapidly, into an ominous era in
global politics and it behooves us to consider whether our juridical
practices can keep pace with that movement.
PART ONE

I.

The Visible Side of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

Ask a legally trained observer, what is Hamdi v. Rumsfeld about?,
and the answer will speak in terms of the propriety of executive
detention. The answer might emphasize separation of powers, or it
might highlight the role of habeas corpus in our constitutional system.
The doctrinal richness of the response will depend, of course, on the
legal sophistication of the responder. But what will unite any reasonable
response is the overarching question of executive detention-in this case,
of so-called "enemy combatants." 15 The sovereign's deployment of this
military aggression against Mexico, in the 1800s. See generally ANTHONY ARNOVE,
IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 114 (2006) ("It seems that the idea of American
exceptionalism-that the United States alone has the right, whether by divine sanction or
moral obligation, to bring civilization, or democracy, or liberty to the rest of the world by
violence if necessary-finds acceptance on all sides of the political spectrum."). See also
DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON TERROR 279
(2003) ("A world at peace; a world governed by law; a world in which all peoples are
free to find their own destinies: That dream has not yet come true, it will not come true
soon, but if it ever does come true, it will be brought into being by American armed
might and defended by American might, too.... Our vocation is to support justice with
power.").
15. "The precise etiology of the term 'enemy combatant' is uncertain.... The
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power to detain without trial-to detain on pure prevention grounds-is
"[t]he most controversial
legal power" displayed so far in our so-called
"war on terror."' 16
The most straightforward position, which Justice Thomas alone
might embrace, understands Article II of the Constitution to give the
President unquestioned authority in times of war to executively detain
without trial those deemed to be enemy combatants.17 Congress's
passage of the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) 18 obviated
the need to consider that constitutional viewpoint. Instead, we have this
question: Did Congress authorize the President to resort to executive
detention of enemy combatants through the broad language of the
AUMF? Five Justices thought so, thereby effectively treating the AUMF
as basically a twenty-first century version of the Roman senatus
consultum ultimum, the Roman senate decree that grants authority to the
Roman consuls to take
whatever measures deemed necessary for the
9
salvation of the state.'
Justice Thomas, dissenting in Hamdi and taking the most proexecutive position, argued that congressional authorization for the
executive branch to deal with the terror threat posed by Al Qaeda
government has yet to define the term precisely or apply it consistently in the 'war on
terrorism."' Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Supreme Court's "Enemy Combatant" Decisions:
Recognizing the Rights of Non-Citizens and the Rule of Law, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS.
L. REV. 409, 411 (2005). Congress recently passed legislation concerning the use of
military commissions and defined "enemy combatant" to include not just actual jihadist
fighters but also individuals who provide "material support" for hostilities. Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), creating 10
U.S.C. § 948a(1). The category of "unlawful combatant" was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942). See George P. Fletcher, Black
Hole in Guant6namo Bay, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 121, 123 (2004) ("The concept of the
'unlawful combatant' was invented to explain the legal fate of the eight German
saboteurs tried in Quirin."). The governing plurality opinion in Hamdi relies on Quirin to
obscure the newness of the "enemy combatant" category that is at issue in Hamdi. For a
hard-hitting criticism of this reliance on Quirin, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE
NEXT ATTACK 22-31 (2006). But leaving aside the viability of Quirin as precedent in
Hamdi, the fact remains that the use of the "enemy combatant" designation as a marker of
guilt, which then renders the detention a form of punishment, is indisputably new.
Whether such a designation is what is going on in our so-called war on terror is a matter
we will explore later in this article. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2047, 2053 n. 17 (2005).
16. Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism:An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime,
in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 181 (Mark

Tushnet ed., 2005).
17. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579-98 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
18. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
19. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 41 (Kevin Attell trans. 2005).
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immunizes from judicial review the President's decision to detain anyone
deemed an unlawful enemy combatant. 20 The polar opposite position,
expressed by Justice Scalia, with the agreement of Justice Stevens,
denies the President the power to executively detain United States
citizens unless Congress suspends the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus.2 1
On this view, a mere statutory grant of authority to executively detain
U.S. citizens is an illegitimate circumvention of the constitutional
mandate that a congressional suspension of the Writ be the nation's sole
device to deal with captured U.S. citizens who have opted to fight for the
enemy, if the criminaljustice system, which is highly regulated by the
2
Constitution, is to be bypassed.
The gray middle, with Justice O'Connor taking the lead, asserts that
Congress may grant to the President the power of executive detention,
but the judiciary retains the authority to ensure that some measure of due
process is accorded the detainee to ensure that the detention decision is
accurate. 23 The gray middle tells the detainee, your detention depends on
whether you are an "enemy combatant," and the due process clause
grants you certain prerogatives to ensure that the classification is
accurate.24 By preserving a role for the judiciary, the gray middle
congratulates itself for thwarting the effort to "condense power into a
single branch of government. ' 25 And so, what captures most people's
20. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579.
21. See id. at 573.
22. See id. at 574-75.
23. See id. at 534-35. The gray middle is itself divided into two camps, which is
why O'Connor's opinion only constitutes a plurality and not a majority. The two camps
are divided on the hermeneutic question of whether Congress did indeed authorize the
President to executively detain enemy combatants. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Rehnquist, and Breyer read the AUMF to grant that authorization, see id. at 518-19;
Justices Souter and Ginsberg demanded more specificity in the AUMF, given our
nation's regret for overreacting against Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor. See id. at
545. Souter's concurrence focused on the statutory manifestation of that regret, the NonDetention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001, a law that Souter and Ginsberg understood to restrict
the power of executive detention to situations where Congress clearly authorizes it. See
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542-54. The Non-Detention Act arose "to preclude another episode
like the one described in Korematsu v. United States." Id. at 542. Although Thomas
filed an opinion in dissent, he agreed with O'Connor on the fundamental point that the
AUMF granted authority to the President to detain enemy combatants. See id. at 587.
24. Scalia devotes considerable attention to O'Connor's effort to insert into the
jurisprudential black hole of enemy-combatant detentions a certain quantum of due
process. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 556-72. Scalia argues that the Court has no institutional
power to do such a thing. See id. at 575-76. After all, Congress itself, according to
Scalia, has no power to create such a black hole in the jurisprudential universe through
ordinary legislation. See id. Suspending the criminal process is an act that the
Constitution textually governs. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
25. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. It should be noted that no one on the Court denies the
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attention in reading Hamdi is O'Connor's assertion that a "state of war is
not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nation's citizens., 26 Embedded in O'Connor's due-process discussion is
the understanding that the criminal trial is the paradigm method for
justifying detention outside the public-health realm.
Hamdi thus reveals three viewpoints or approaches to executive
detention: (1) the unilateral executive view, pursued by the Bush
27
Administration (and perhaps with the agreement of Justice Thomas);
(2) the absolutist civil libertarian stance that restricts the power of the
executive to detain enemy combatants to that extraordinary situation
where the Great Writ has been suspended (Scalia and Stevens); 28 and
(3) the "process-based, institutionally oriented (as opposed to rightsoriented) framework,, 29 exemplified by the gray middle, that gives the
judiciary the role of overseer of the enemy-combatant classification
exercise, a role that the Writ must preserve for the judiciary.30 With civil
liberties, and by extension, our core values and national identity at stake
in the controversy, the gray middle's prevailing process-based approach
puts its faith for a legitimate resolution of the security-liberty balance on
the disbursed responsibilities of the three branches. On the surface, the
gray middle's decisional architecture seems to be true to our democratic
values, and thus faithful to our Enlightenment heritage. But let us plunge
beneath the surface....
II.

The Gold-Rush Mentality and the Quandaries Over Separation of
Powers: Legality in Peril

In a talk entitled, "Ordered Liberty in the Age of International
Terrorism," former Assistant Attorney General Viet D. Dinh claimed that
in our fight against terrorism, "the tradeoff between security and liberty
is a false choice" because our pursuit of security is defined by a single
President the authority to implement a system of enemy-combatant detention.
26. Id. (citation omitted). For a discussion of the positive reception the Hamdi
opinion received, see JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 155-56 (2006). See also Kathleen A. Bergin, Authenticating
American Democracy, 26 PACE L. REv. 397, 397 (2006) ("The decision in Hamdi helped
repair America's standing in the international community at a time when other nations
questioned its commitment to democratic ideals.").
27. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579-98.
28. See id. at 554-79.
29. Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 16, at 162.
30. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-35. In the wake of Hamdi, the government uses what it
calls the Combatant Status Review Tribunals to adjudicate whether one is properly
classified as an "enemy combatant." See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp.2d 152, 162
(D.D.C. 2004). See also Dept. of Def. Memorandum for the Sec'y of the Navy, Order
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 1 (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d2004O7O7review.pdf.
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motivation, the creation of a secure space for liberty to thrive. 31 Viet
Dinh is here expressing two elements of modernity working in tandem:
rationality as means-ends thinking to subdue an enemy (just as we use
rationality to subdue Nature itself) so as to preserve a form of liberty that
is congenial to the liberal understanding of the self, an Enlightenment
construct in which the self is a rational agent entitled to pursue its own
subjectively desired ends.32 Though they would not likely conceptualize
it in this philosophical way, most Americans would probably accept the
simplistic thesis Viet Dinh expresses; that in the end our pursuit of
security is in the service of this particular form of liberty. The narrative
ambitions of the Hamdi opinion are largely invisible to us-a matter we
will pursue directly in Part Two of this article-because the opinion
itself embraces this same simplistic idea. Consider what the Court says it
is "called upon" to do.3 3 It is not only the legality of a particular
detention that must be resolved, but the more constitutionally technical34
question of what "process" is due in addressing that legality question.
That then raises the possibility that what makes this a "difficult time" for
our nation, 35 to use O'Connor's evocative locution, is the fact that
legality itself is being attacked by an aggressive Executive. Besieged
from two sides, Legality is in peril. The Court is, on this reading, "called
upon" to enter onto the world stage to protect Legality itself.
Packaging the narrative drama in these terms puts the Court on
comfortable terrain. When crisis hits the nation, when we tell ourselves
that sovereignty itself is under siege, the Court eschews the hard work of
formulating or articulating the scope of our rights and instead tackles the
far easier task of discerning the proper allocation of power between the
Executive and the Legislative branches, the institutional actors "with
different democratic pedigrees, different incentives, and different

31. Viet D. Dinh, Ordered Liberty in the Age of International Terrorism, Harold
Leventhal Talk, June 7, 2002 (on file with author). Viet Dinh's story line is quite simple:
The terrorist threat is an assault on our security to accomplish the precise goal of
undermining-stripping from us, really-our liberty. And that fact, Dinh argues, is what
differentiates the Islamic terrorist from the garden-variety criminal:
[T]he terrorist is fundamentally different from the criminal offender normally
encountered in our criminal justice system. By attacking the foundation of
order in our society, the terrorist seeks to demolish the structure of liberty that
governs our lives. By fomenting terror among the masses, the terrorist seeks to
incapacitate the citizenry from exercising the liberty to pursue our individual
ends. This is not criminality. It is war-like attack on our polity.
Id.
32. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 38-46 (Free
Press 1984) (1975).
33. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
34.

See id. at 524.

35.

Id. at 509.
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interests to which they respond, to provide the political judgment behind
policies adopted in the name of security. 3 6 I say the institutional powerallocation question is "easier," but perhaps it is better to say "safer,"
since the Court has often resisted the movement towards concentration of
governmental power 37 (not private power-high concentrations of
private power is more than just okay; that is what makes America...
well, America). But that limited-government paradigm, which might be
regarded as the core guarantee of due process, 38 excludes from judicial
analysis the activities of the nation as a member of a global community.
That is, the Court regulates the mechanics of govemmentality 39-- or, as
Issacharoff and Pildes put it, "the cases show a high level of judicial
attentiveness to questions of institutional decision making in general and,
more specifically, to the role of the Constitution as a check on
unilateralism by the executivea,40-but turns a blind eye to the growth of
sovereignty as it is expressed in the global activities of the nation.4'
In fact, as the recent passage of the 2006 Military Commissions Act
36. Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 16, at 163. The recent Hamdan decision
exemplifies this process orientation. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
There is good reason to be dubious about the efficacy of the executive and legislative
branches in protecting civil liberties and civil rights. See Cole, supra note 9, at 2590.
Some scholars regard this approach to "make[] particular sense with respect to the novel
issues posed by the war on terrorism" because it fits well with the "particular
competence" of lawyers. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2052.
37. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11 (1957) ("blending of executive,
legislative, and judicial powers in one person or even in one branch of the Government is
ordinarily regarded as the very acme of abolutism").
38. This obviously would be a very restrictive understanding of "due process," since
it could justify all sorts of shocking governmental action, so long as the democratic
branches appropriately conduct themselves in passing legislation. See Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Ill
YALE L.J. 1259, 1266 (2002) ("[The] Constitution's text, structure, and logic demand
approval by Congress if life, liberty, or property are to be significantly curtailed or
abridged. Nothing less is meant by the Constitution's simple but majestic command that
no person 'be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.').
39. For a full explication of the term governmentality, see Michel Foucault,
Governmentality, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 201-22

(James D. Faubion ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans, The New Press 2000) (1994).
40. Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 16, at 164.
41. The Court's unwillingness to be faithful to the vision of limited government
when it comes to our nation's global activities is exemplified by the fact that article 1,
section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution is simply unenforced when it comes to the
Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. This provision provides
that "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of
all public Money shall be published from time to time." JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 12.
Withdrawing this constitutional provision when it comes to our military activities,
especially when those activities are probably the greatest threat to our civil liberties and
the fate of the planet, raises questions about the parameters of our commitment to
democracy.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:2

shows,42 this process jurisprudence invites the expansion of sovereignty
through legislative manufacturing of a rights regime outside the
established framework of the Constitution. 43 It is thus wrong to criticize
governmental actions in the war on terror as lawless, for sovereignty
forges ahead-in a resurgence of sorts, according to Judith Butleranthrough a process of legality that manufactures "law" to suit the state's
global ambitions.4 5 Detainees at Guantanamo are not on the receiving
end of any sort of "lawless" conduct. Their existence-and existence
should be taken quite literally-has come within the ambit of the most
fearsome sort of legality, a form of law that permits the bracketing of all
other law, a legality that has reduced them to bare-life beings with no
right to have rights (other than, at the most, utilitarian prerogatives to
pose challenges to evidence so as to improve the administrative accuracy
of the detention proceedings).
This fearsome sort of legality is largely shielded from our view (that
is, from the view of Americans-the ones wielding this legality) with the
veil of democracy, knitted together with the thread of process
jurisprudence. Within process jurisprudence, there is no inquiry into the
fundamental question: allocation of power between the branches to
accomplish.., what? It is very easy to skip that question, and thus easy
to slide into or accept circular argumentation.46 With the focus on the
42. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
43. To leap past O'Connor's opinion and into Justice Scalia's dissent, Scalia's
argument expresses the general idea here concerning the manufacturing of a legal regime,
that what the majority of the Court sanctions in Hamdi is Congress's bypass of the
unpleasantness of suspending the Great Writ, which the established framework of the
Constitution forces upon Congress if the normal criminal adjudicatory process is to be
avoided, through the judicial manufacturing of a legal regime of rights arising from
Congress's passage of the Authorization to Use Military Force. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's Hamdi dissent is a twentyfirst century version of Justice Sutherland's dissent in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting), where Sutherland said,
"[i]f the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as whey
they comfort, they may as well be abandoned."
44.

See JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWER OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE

53 (2004). When critics of Guantanamo detention speak of it as "lawless," they are
referring to the Executive's efforts to remove those detentions from the purview of
civilian courts. That is a forceful criticism, as the selection of Guantanamo Bay as a
detention site was motivated by precisely this desire to seal out the federal judiciary. See
DAVID ROSE, GUANTANAMO: THE WAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS 32-33 (2004).
45. Regarding the point about the manufacturing of law, see BUTLER supra note 44,
at 58. Regarding the geo-political contention that the process of legality must suit the
state's global ambitions, this explains why there is so much hand-wringing over military
tribunals. On the one hand, the Executive's control over the operation of these tribunals
offends the quest for separated powers that characterizes our aspiration to live by the rule
of law; but on the other hand their use may be essential to military conquest. See
generally Katyal & Tribe, supra note 38.
46. Consider that what fascinates us about Lincoln's dramatic aggrandizement of
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distribution of power, arguments about what to do in this so-called war
on terror start off with assumptions about the nature of the problem
(crudely expressed as violent Jihadists who hate our freedoms) and then
appeal to those assumptions
to justify certain actions that have come to
' 47
constitute this "war.
The grip of this circularity, ironically enough, gains its strength
from the ideology of legality, the very thing that the Court seeks to
protect in this narrative drama, because that ideology fences out
considerations of history, sociology, politics, and much else that makes
up the human experience. What Judith Shklar observed over forty years
ago captures the point here: the "legalism" mindset-which thoroughly
infuses the process jurisprudence that characterizes the Hamdi analysis-produces the "urge to draw a clear line between law and non-law" which,
in turn, leads to "the constructing of ever more refined and rigid systems
of formal definitions" and thus "serve[s] to isolate law completely from
the social context within which it exists. 4 8 The pretense behind the
process jurisprudence-and here pretense is purpose-is the resilient
belief that law can be, and ought to be, impervious to ideological
considerations. And so, the avoidance of the "accomplish... what?"
question is far from accidental; it is the quintessential act of legality
itself.49 More than that, "[t]his deliberate isolation of the legal
system... is itself a refined political ideology, the expression of a
preference" that masquerades as a form of judicial neutrality we find
suitable in a democracy.5 °
If the Executive's asserted prerogative to prosecute a war in a way
that will assure victory is confronted with the prior question about what
power during the Civil War is that he went beyond constitutional boundaries-that is, he
unilaterally reallocated the power among the three branches-out of a moral obligation to
avert secession. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 595 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
Preserving the Union required winning the war. The accomplishing-what question is
undeniably clear. That clarity then allows a constitutional theorist like Sanford Levinson
to ask, "Do national security interests-including preservation of the basic constitutional
order-count as sufficiently moral concerns to trump what might otherwise be regarded
as the clear meaning-'the letter'-of the law?" Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Norms in a State of PermanentEmergency, 40 GA. L. REv. 699, 701 (2006).
47. See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
48. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 2 (Harvard
University Press 2d ed. 1984) (1964).
49. Judith Shklar notes, to illustrate the walled-off nature of legalism, that Winston
Churchill once said in Parliament that it was impossible for trade unionists to expect the
judiciary to understand the nature of social conflicts or to even understand what it means
to be fair. See SHKLAR, supra note 48, at 11. It may thus be true as well that it is
impossible to expect our judiciary to understand the global conflicts and tensions that
undergird the legal controversies that arise from our so-called war on terror.
50. SHKLAR, supra note 48, at 34.
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exactly we want to accomplish in that war-if, that is, we confront the
1
question posed by Slavoj Zizek, noted at the outset of this article 5'-then
the idea of national security trumping "law" takes on an entirely different
analytical hue. Professor Owen Fiss is probably right when he says that
the Justices in Hamdi "searched for ways to honour the Constitution
without compromising vital national interests. 5 2 But that is a distinctly
unsatisfying observation if what we are concerned about is the
identification of what exactly those "national interests" are.53 We may
not feel unsatisfied because, in the context of Hamdi, it undoubtedly
seems pointless to ask what we are trying to accomplish, since the
answer strikes us as obvious. We are in a deadly struggle to stamp out
the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda, and more generally, terrorism
arising from a certain violent and nihilistic strain of Islamic
fundamentalism. Our foreign policy is expressly fueled by the outlook
that preemptive attacks are not merely an option, but are the option to be
used. In the words of the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security
to
Strategy document, "In the new world we have entered, the only path
act., 54
peace and security is the path of action. And... America will
O'Connor and the rest of the Court members implicitly understand
our foreign policy and the goal to be pursued in these terms, which
explains why the Hamdi opinion nowhere raises a question about the
objectives that the so-called "war on terror" seeks to accomplish. After
all, the stories we want to tell dictate the stories that we do tell. We want
to tell ourselves stories about our own essential goodness and
benevolence, our own fidelity to the rule of law; and that desire dictates
the juridical story that ultimately gets told. Once one posits that our
foreign policy is purely and always defensive, as well as benevolent in
motivation,5 5 then whatever the juridical story-even one where the
51. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
52. Owen Fiss, The War against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 O.J.L.S. 235,
256 (2006).
53. Fiss says the Justices are "committed to the rule of law" but are "also...
practical people" who "see themselves as responsible for protecting the interests of the
nation they serve." Id. That Fiss seems to take for granted that "practical people" who
desire what is best for their nation will defer to the nation's foreign policy objectives
speaks volumes about our unwillingness to confront and reckon with the deepest
challenge we face as a nation. After all, why is it not the case that "practical people" who
are concerned about where we are heading as a nation, Supreme Court Justices among
them, will want to give priority to the question, are we on an empire-building quest that
is incompatible with the sort of civil-liberties society that we regard as essential to our
identity as a nation? Why is it not true that this question is the most practical one of all?
Why not allow for the possibility that all the handwringing over executive unilateralism
in this so-called war on terror is mere quibbling when compared to the gigantic question
of what our global pursuits really are and then reckoning with the juridical implications?
54. See supra note 6.
55. See LENS, supra note 11, at I ("The United States, like other nations, has
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nation's highest Court announces that the Executive has no blank check
to prosecute a war on terror-the underlying reality inscribed upon the
world's inhabitants, the consequences real people must absorb somehow,
is one where "the United States has established that its only limit on the
world stage will be its military power., 56 As O'Connor sees it, the real
problem here is that, given that the allocation-of-power issue is tied to
the goal of eliminating the terrorist threat, we have to reckon with the
probability that this allocation is not just an emergency provision, but
one that will be cemented into our society, since the current emergency is
likely to be, in all practicality, a permanent emergency. 57 But to say we
are in a struggle to stamp out a terrorist threat posed by Islamic
fundamentalism, and to say that "the only path to peace and security is
the path of action," conceals-renders invisible, a postmodernist would
likely put it-an even more fundamental, and more radical, question: the
allocation of power that the Court is called upon to establish is in the
service of eliminating a terrorist threat to accomplish.., what? The
standard answer is, our security, which most Americans would take to
mean, to avert an attack on our homeland, and thus, as it was with
Lincoln, to preserve the Union. And so, we accept as obvious that our
dilemma is finding the right security-liberty balance.
The problem with that standard answer is two-fold. First, it glosses
over the fact that we face no true existential threat, no enemy that
genuinely threatens to seize control over our state apparatus and foist
upon us a form of government to which we would not consent. That fact
alone distinguishes our current war on terrorism from Lincoln's quest to
preserve the Union against secession. 58 Second, this we-must-protectthe-Homeland answer is far too convenient as a conversation stopper.
formulated a myth of morality to assuage its conscience and sustain its image.").
56. Michael Hatfield, Legitimacy, Identity, Violence and the Law, 24 S. CENT. REV.
131, 132 (2007). Hatfield offers what I take to be a compelling psychological insight into
why many, if not most, Americans harbor such deep illusions about the global ambitions
of the United States and the disturbing consequences of American assertions of military
power. "Humans have an immense ability to inflict cruelty. However, we have a very
limited ability to believe ourselves to be cruel." Id. at 133.
57. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520-21 (2004).
58. See ACKERMAN, supra note 15, at 56; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 38, at 1272
("[E]arlier military tribunals-in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Civil War,
and World War II--occurred during 'total wars,' . . . wars in which there was a real
danger that America might lose its Constitution and its way of life."). The idea that a
nation must have the flexibility to bypass the restrictions of its Constitution when faced
with an existential threat, a genuine threat to its existence, is captured in the slogan that
the Constitution is not a "suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
160 (1963). The danger, of course, is that the quickly arrived at judgment that a nation is
experiencing an existential threat could produce legal precedent that "lies about like a
loaded weapon." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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When the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy document
avers that "the only path to peace and security is the path of action, ",59 we
ought to ask what global arrangements are contemplated through that
"path of action." When that document announces that "America will
act,, 60 it surely cannot suffice to say that the goal is merely eliminating a
threat to attain security. All empires and empire-seeking nations engage
in aggression under the rubric of self-defense and the deployment of
noble-aims rhetoric. 6' These justifications carry no genuine meaning but
are devices of the powerful and the privileged, with the acquiescence and
often encouragement by a frightened populace, to quell unsettling
questions from dissenters within the society. 62 Stop and think for a
moment, how is it that the nation with the most formidable military
might-the beneficiary of the hugest imbalance in military power ever in
world history-is also the nation that professes to be the most imperiled
by threats throughout the world, often threatened by impoverished
peasant societies (Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, Granada,
etc.)? 6 3 An empire must always cast itself as vulnerable to attack and as
constantly being under attack in order to justify its own military
aggression.6 4 This is most acutely true when the empire is a democracy
that must garner the consent of the populace, which explains why so
much of governmental rhetoric concerning global affairs is alarmist in
tone.
The point is that quandaries over constitutional interpretationought we be prudential, or are other techniques more closely tied to the
text the only legitimate mode of constitutional adjudication-may very
well mask what may be the most urgent issue of all, which concerns what
exactly this nation's true identity is at this moment in world history, what
it is that we are pursuing. Whereas Sanford Levinson has courageously
59. See supra note 6.
60. Id.
61. See SCHELL, supra note 6, at 341 ("Every empire in history has concealed coarse
self-interest behind a veil of noble ideals, and there is no reason to believe that American
imperialism would be an exception.").
62. The Roman Empire, during its declining phase, constantly presented itself as
under siege and acting in self-defense against "evil-minded neighbors." MICHAEL S.
HUNT, IDEOLOGY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 195 (1987) (quoting Joseph Schumpeter).
For an account of how the American empire's self-destructive tendencies are reminiscent
of that of the Roman empire's, see BERMAN, supra note 4, at 304-06; JOHNSON, supra
note 7, at 15-16.
63. There is one jurisprudential illustration worthy of note. The United States
argued, quite remarkably, that its direct aggression against Nicaragua, as well as its
support of the Contras, was justified on grounds of self-defense, a claim that the
International Court of Justice rejected. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26).
64. See supra notes 61-62.
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argued that "too many [] people 'venerate' the Constitution and use it as
a kind of moral compass, ' 65 which leads to a certain blindness, I raise for
consideration an idea that Hamdi suppresses through its narrative
techniques, which is the proposition that too many people "venerate" this
nation without any genuine consideration of the particular way we have,
since World War II, manifested ourselves as a nation. I join Levinson's
suspicion that our Constitution is venerated as an idea, as an abstraction,
without much thought given to its particulars.6 6 It is important to be
open to the possibility that the same is true with regard to our nationthe possibility that we venerate the idea of America (undoubtedly worth
venerating), but remain (willfully?) ignorant of the particulars of our
actual responsibility for the health of the planet and its inhabitants. 67 To
openly consider such issues is not anti-American-an utterly absurd
locution-for to suggest that it is amounts to a denial that U.S. actions
(as opposed to rhetoric that leeches off of the promise and ideal of
"America") can be measured by some yardstick of propriety that applies
to all nations.68
The very idea of a yardstick of propriety requires a prior acceptance
of two ideas: one, that we are part of something larger, that we are
properly accountable to others and to that larger circumstance; and two,
that it is not a betrayal or traitorous for a people within a nation to look
within itself.69

65.

66.

Issacharoff and Pildes, the most prominent process

Levinson, supra note 46, at 704.

See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).

THE

67. My observations in the text correlate roughly with Nietzsche's stance vis a vis
Kantian Enlightenment. The urgent question for Nietzsche is, what sort of person am I to
become?, whereas the Kantian question, and the juridical one in Hamdi, boils down to,

what rules should Ifollow?
68. See BARBER, supra note 6, at 99-100 (function of American exceptionalism is to
avert universalizing international and moral standards as a way of restricting America's
global ambitions). The very idea of "anti-Americanism" is an expression of American
exceptionalism; indeed, it speaks to the inchoate belief that "Americanism" is itself
infused with religiosity. See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 249.
69.

See generally WENDELL BERRY, LIFE IS A MIRACLE (2000) [hereinafter BERRY,

MIRCALE]. The inability of a nation to apply a moral standard to itself that it readily
applies to others might very well be an endemic feature of nationhood and nationalism.
The Chilean writer Ariel Dorfman put it best, in talking about the practice of torture:
Make no mistake: Every regime that tortures does so in the name of salvation,
some superior goal, some promise of paradise. Call it communism, call it the
free market, call it the free world, call it the national interest, call it fascism,
call it the leader, call it civilization, call it the service of God, call it the need
for information, call it what you will, the cost of paradise, the promise of some
sort of paradise.., will always be hell for at least one person somewhere,
sometime.
Ariel Dorfman, Untying an Ethical Question on Torture-Happinessfor All is One
Justification,S.F. CHRON., May 9, 2004, at El, quoted in Hatfield, supra note 56, at 135.
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theorists, observe that process jurisprudence may be inadequate to
address the risk that we "might succumb to wartime hysteria., 70 I would
broaden that observation so as to be open to the possibility that the risk
goes beyond just wartime hysteria, that our desire for security and
military victory, rooted in our repudiation of a genuine universal
yardstick of propriety that we willingly apply to ourselves (often called
American exceptionalism 7 1)-which means that security and military
victory are not ipso facto the same thing-could easily slide us into
sanctioning a form of sovereignty that is dangerously outmoded and far
out of proportion to what circumstances warrant.
Process jurisprudence supposedly has the merit of putting the
balance of security and liberty into the hands of the democratic
institutions of our government. But what it cannot bring into the field of
vision-and what is absolutely banished from view in Hamdi-is the
possibility that the democratic institutions themselves, and perhaps even
the democratic culture generally, the public sphere of that culture, have
been corrupted so severely as to reduce process jurisprudence to a shell
game. 72 More specifically, the formal processes of governmentality
responding to crisis is judicially monitored, but the mythos of our
national identity, particularly the idea that every international crisis boils
down to the unquestioned fact that the United States at least endeavors to
act solely in self defense and to promote some benevolent goal that the
entire world ought to stand behind, is manufactured and thus some
hegemonic pursuit in this global "war on terror" remains not just
juridically ignored, but muted and marginalized in much of our public
73
discussions about it,
70. Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 16, at 173.
71. American exceptionalism, reaching its intellectual apex in the 1950's, was a
form of self-understanding that "assume[d] that American society was not only good, but
that it was itself a normative phenomenon." EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 256 (1973).
"The tendency to see America as an ideal appeared continuously through the nation's
history." Id. at 270. See also SIOBAN MCEvOY-LEVY, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2001); Koh, supra note 14; Mary Ellen O'Connell, American
Exceptionalism and the InternationalLaw of Self-Defense, 31 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
43 (2002). For an excellent explication of how American exceptionalism and the
permanency of the state of exception intertwine to produce a unique global war, see
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at 8.
72. See Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush-PartII (forthcoming in the PENN
ST. L. REV. Summer 2008). For more on the sorry state of our public sphere, see JAMES
HOWARD

KUNSTLER,

THE GEOGRAPHY

OF NOWHERE:

THE

RISE AND

DECLINE OF

AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 67, 274 (1994) (arguing that as a culture we do not
understand the worthiness of a vibrant public realm, thus leading to a society with few
genuinely vibrant public spaces).
73. See BARBER, supra note 6, at 49 ("No nation... has been so committed to its
exceptionalist myths in its policies and practices as the United States, and none have
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Under process jurisprudence, it is the wording of a piece of
legislation, not the decoding of the slogan national security, that
ultimately matters. And under process jurisprudence, fundamental
decisions have already been made-fundamental decisions concerning
the nature of our global ambitions and the way we will pursue thembefore the judiciary can confront the so-called security-liberty balance,
which means that the analytical deck has been stacked by the time the
justiciable question-that is, what we regard as the justiciable
question-is posed. Stacking the analytical deck in this way reduces the
Court members to the role of technicians in the service of whatever
pursuit the sovereign happens to choose.74
This is why it is worth asking what many might regard as a naive, if
not tendentious, question: is it true that in the case of Hamdi and other
post-9/1 I cases, the judiciary's quandary over allocation of power is
actually in the service of genuine security, meaning physical safety of the
populace? Does the seemingly obvious answer that we seek only to
protect the safety of our communities against naked violence blind us to
a deeper ailment within our culture? Is it possible that the allocation of
power, at bottom, is rooted in a dark side of our Enlightenment heritage,
an impulse within Legality that threatens us in a way similar to the
75
Thanatos drive Freud identified as creating civilization's discontent?
Perhaps Hamdi itself, as a cultural document, signals yet another
capitulation to the impulse to embrace a form of means-ends rationality
that supports the Enlightenment drive to control and subdue.76 Perhaps
made exceptionalism so central to their national life and their international politics.
Among the exceptionalist myths that fire the American imagination, the myth of
innocence is perhaps paramount .. ").See also JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 3-4.
74. Cf SHKLAR, supra note 48, at 38 ("Impersonal judgment and the striving for
objectivity are intellectual virtues of the highest order. But they are the virtues of
observers, of technicians, and of strategists, not of those who must make social choices
for themselves and for others in situations where it is far from clear what ends can and
should be pursued ....).
75. See generally SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James
Strachey ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1989) (1930).
76. At the heart of the Enlightenment, and the whole project of modernity, is the
power of rationality, of rigorous analysis to subdue whatever might confront us. But
deep within the Enlightenment project, hidden in the darkness, is the urge, the violent and
deathly impulse, to control and dominate. To the Western mind, in the heyday of
Enlightenment thought, a spotted coastline from a European shipping vessel is but an
invitation to the inland where what awaits are the "lineaments of empire." See EDWARD
0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 15-48 (1998). The quest for
empire is a manifestation of this dark side of the Enlightenment. See Richard Falk,
Identifying Limits on a Borderless Map in the First Post-Modern War, in 11 SEPTEMBER
2001: WAR, TERROR AND JUDGMENT 56 (Bulent Gokay & R.B.J. Walker eds., 2002). The
"realist" school of international relations embraces the anthropological (one might even
say the Freudian) view that "the incessant drive for power is rooted in human nature."
HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 167 (attributing this view to Hans Morgenthau, the founder
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what Hamdi shows is that 9/11 has not really triggered a need to
recalibrate the security-liberty balance, but has actually unleashed that
which has already filtered into and corrupted our cultureEnlightenment's dark side, as the Frankfurt School understood it7 7-and
is thus one among many cultural documents that ought to tell us we are
not averting a new dark age, but are already in it, or at least, to borrow a
phrase from Wendell Berry, that we are "leapfrogging into the dark. 78
It is impossible, without the benefit of historical distance, to answer
these questions with what amounts to comforting certitude. But they are
worth confronting, since the fate of so many people depends on it, given
our unrivaled ability and frightening willingness to use military force.
Our culture's inability to ask such questions in any meaningful way, as
opposed to marginalizing those who plead for them to be confronted, is
somewhat reminiscent of how early Enlightenment culture treated
scientific endeavors.
"Science," during the rise of Enlightenment
culture, rebuffed the why question, banished it as a remnant of medieval
darkness, because the why-ness of a certain scientific pursuit suggested
that certain domains of knowledge were bad, off-limits, taboo. The
whole cultural mindset of the Enlightenment was to jettison precisely
such a suggestion. That cultural mindset produced a faith all its own,
that all scientific pursuits, and by extension all human quests for
knowledge, will in the end promote human flourishing. It has taken the
devastation of our planet to reveal the folly of that faith, a blind-spot in
the Western mind. It may turn out, as a sort of silver lining on a dark
cloud, that the terrorism arising from Islamic jihadists may do something
of the realist school of international relations). In that sense the realists repudiate as
naive the quest for the juridification of international relations based on the intrinsic
existence of the dark side of the Enlightenment.
77. See generally MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cumming trans., 1972) (1944).
The Frankfurt School was a
group of interdisciplinary thinkers associated with the privately financed Institute for
Social Research, based in Frankfurt, Germany. Douglas Kellner Critical Theory and the
Crisis of Social Theory, 33 Soc. PERSP. 11, 13 (1990). The Frankfurt School theorists,
influenced principally by the dialectical philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx,
made their presence felt as a reaction to positivism (the Anglo-Austrian tradition of
logical empiricism), mostly during the period shortly before and after World War II. Id.
They rebelled against what they considered to be a positivist illusion that theory
amounted to nothing more than the correct mirroring of an independent realm of facts.
See id. at 17-19. For an overview of critical theory, as developed by the Frankfurt
School, see DAVID HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO
HABERMAS (1980).
78. BERRY, MIRACLE, supra note 69, at 33. In foreign policy, the problem has
always been in the packaging. The administration in power inevitably grapples with the
difficulty of presenting itself as committed to formal democracy and freedom while faced
with the reality that "the United States may often need to do terrible things to get what it
has always wanted...." Alan Tonelson, Why Things Turned Violent, N.Y. TIMES, § 7,
Dec. 25, 1998 (reviewing GABRIEL KOLKO, CONFRONTING THE THIRD WORLD (1988)).
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similar.
III. A Thought Experiment Couched as a Doctrinal Proposal
Robert Cover says that the "surreal epistemology of due process"
forges "meaning in our normative world., 79 The epistemology of due
process within Hamdi, the discussion in Part Two suggests, is predicated
on an ontology that situates so-called enemy combatants (read:
"terrorists") as the impediment to a global order moving inexorably
towards ubiquitous democracy, the free flow of capital and goods, and
the tightening nexus of cultures and peoples through ever more
sophisticated communication systems and mass media. But what it
shields from view, through legalistic (hence, seemingly apolitical)
reasoning, is the new post-Cold War reality of a free-market global
order, loosely captured by the umbrella term globalization, managed for
the benefit of multinational corporations through a level of unilateral
force never witnessed in human history. It is a global reality that is
moving rapidly towards the evisceration of the distinction between war
and peace. 80 The administrative decisional process of categorizing
people as enemy combatants forges a meaning of our nation and its
hegemonic aspirations that is studiously removed from genuine debate
and argument within our juridical institutions and within the public
sphere generally. What more profound and important issue is there, for
our courts and for us as citizens, than the choice between preserving our
republic and pursuing empire? Buried within Hamdi is that unexplored
choice.

With all the hand-wringing over Executive authority and
congressional authorization, the Hamdi Court ignores completely what
will surely become the long-lasting meaning of Guantanamo, the place,
which is Guantanamo, the symbol, this article's shorthand gesture for a
form of indivisible sovereignty that equates sovereign power with the
ability to inflict violence without juridical impediment.
Despite
O'Connor's efforts to keep the opinion tightly focused on the particular
facts of Yaser Hamdi's capture on an Afghani battlefield, Hamdi itself
unleashed-or, at the very least, could not restrain-the ascendancy of

79. Cover, Forward,supra note 1, at 8.
80. Giorgio Agamben argues similarly that the Bush Administration's war-on-terror
policies attempt "to produce a situation in which the emergency becomes the rule, and the
very distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes
impossible." AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 22.
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Guantanamo, the culmination of sovereignty-as-violence outside a
juridical framework in order to attain the unattainable. The unattainable
being a global peace through the military might of a sole superpower
imposing order upon a global free market, a globalized role for the
United States that is reminiscent of liberalism's vision of the State as
night-watchman over the activities of private actors. 81 It does not take
much imagination to see that Guantanamo-style detention to impose
order on a global community can infiltrate a domestic culture faced with
forces of disorder within national borders. This deeper significance of
Hamdi is obscured by the seemingly legalistic process-oriented question
of how much power the President has in a time of war, in light of what
Congress has legislated.
That process-oriented question rests upon the proposition that we
are actually at war, which, to say the least, is highly contestable. We are
flirting with the prospect of stripping the word war of any genuine
meaning--or, at least, of the understanding we have had since Carl von
Clausewitz's elucidation of war as a political instrument.8 2 We are more
than flirting with the possibility of instituting a state of permanent
military engagement ("warfare," if you prefer that locution); we are
actively pursuing a course to do precisely that-designing the capability
to use military force as a form of police action to pacify a global
population struggling to come to grips with a new post-Cold War reality
that has come to be called, rather glibly, globalization. It is a reality
where "war" is no longer about conquest, but about pacification, where
"terrorism" is a misnomer for resistance within an environment of
widespread global civil unrest. It is a reality where other nation-states
find their sovereign autonomy draining rapidly within the win-or-lose
networks of a global society.
"[D]ifficult time," Justice O'Connor says in launching her opinion
in Hamdi;83 but hidden is this new reality to elucidate why indeed it is so.
The controversy that strikes at the core of our national identity-and
it is this hidden controversy that is most critical in Hamdi--concems our
attitude towards the new globalization reality that I have gestured at
above. Do we operate within these new win-or-lose networks of our
global society? Do we justify what we do globally, through a regime of
international legality, through a juridical framework of international
relations? Or do we instead use military force and detain "enemy
combatants" and inflict "collateral damage" and curtail civil liberties and

81.

See generally UNGER, supra note 32.

82. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (J.J. Graham trans., 1873) (1832),
availableat http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOMENoniKriege2/onwartoc2.html.
83.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
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re-orient regimes of rights through "the unilateral, world-ordering
Had the Hamdi Court
politics of a self-appointed hegemon"?84
considered the question posed by Slavoj Zizek- What ifthe true purpose
of the war [on terror] is to pass to a global emergency state?85 -or
something akin to that question, the antiseptic process jurisprudence that
so much occupies the attention of jurists and scholars would likely give
way to the momentous controversy that propels but remains hidden in
Hamdi. But so long as our mindset about "war" is frozen in an
anachronistic Clausewitzian framework whereby military force is but an
instrument of politics in a global environment dominated by competing
nation-states exerting their wills, then the antiseptic process
jurisprudence will operate as the default analysis for the judiciary when
faced with Guantanamo issues.
I characterize as "antiseptic" the process jurisprudence on display in
Hamdi because it concerns itself only with the wording of a
congressional enactment: did Congress actually authorize Guantanamotype detentions for "enemy combatants" when it authorized the Bush
Administration to use military force against those responsible for the
9/11 attacks? Had the Court concluded, as Justices Souter and Ginsberg
advocated, 86 that Congress did not specifically authorize Guantanamotype detention, the upshot would be that the Executive would have to
secure that more specific authorization from Congress. We have seen
this vacuous maneuvering recently, in the wake of the Court's decision in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 87 a case that some have applauded as momentous
in its vindication of core American values. 88 Far from being momentous,
Hamdan is but another exemplar of the antiseptic process jurisprudence,
for the bottom line in that decision is that the Executive must secure
explicit authorization for certain means of prosecuting the so-called war
on terror-in the case of Hamdan, the use of military commissions to
prosecute war crimes. 89 And the Executive did precisely that, securing
congressional authorization for military-commission prosecutions that
hardly deserve applause for their vindication of core American values. 90
Hamdan did nothing to blunt, let alone seriously address, the shame of
Guantanamo. All it did was provoke the government to expand
84. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 33.
See
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING
(Ronald
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
(2006).

generally

TOWARDS WORLD
OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY

St. John McDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539-53.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
See supra note 26.
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2798.
See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
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sovereign power.
If Guantanamo stands as the twenty-first century symbol of
international lawlessness, of the primacy of force over legality; if
Guantanamo conveys a grand betrayal of American commitment to
human rights; if Guantanamo-the-place is the most visible of many
detention centers operated by the "global hegemon" which enforces a
global order through military force akin to the way municipalities attain
order through a police force, then Guantanamo and Guantanamo-theplace exist with the blessing of the Supreme Court. Not an overt
blessing, to be sure, but a blessing that comes from being blind to what is
in plain sight. Hamdi blesses Guantanamo/Guantanamoby acquiescing
in the Executive's unilateral creation of the category enemy combatantan act calculated to bypass international law-and thus, by that
acquiescence silently endorses the position that, in the arena of foreign
affairs, legality dissolves to leave space for the Hobbesian ability to exert
our own will through the threat of, and our unfettered discretion to
inflict, violence. Hamdi blesses Guantanamo by stepping aside as the
Executive pursues what it says it is entitled to pursue in the National
Security Strategy document of September 2002-use of military
aggression (Guantanamo detention being one form of military
aggression) to maintain global order,
packaged as "preemptive" actions
91
to defend our "national security."
The philosophical ,appeal of international law, when it comes to
matters of war and peace, is that it transmutes the justifiability of war
from that of just or unjust war to that of legal force or illegal aggression.
A cardinal principle in the legality framework governing international
relations is that wars of aggression are prohibited but defensive action is
not. 92 The philosophical appeal stems from the fact that this shift away
from the just-unjust war distinction towards a legality framework
borrows from the key transition in our Enlightenment heritage, which is
the transition from the acceptability of violence and coercion to the
insistence on law and consent.93 Human freedom and dignity, this
heritage holds, depends on that transition. Can America make this
transition in the realm of global affairs? After the ending of the Cold
War and before 9/11, there was hope that it would. 94 But Hamdi elides
91. See supra note 6.
92. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting aggression); U.N. Charter art. 51
(authorizing unilateral force in self-defense).
93. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374 et seq.
(Cambridge University Press 1963); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 17
et seq. (Lester Crocker trans., Pocket Books 1967); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 98-109 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964).
94. See SCHELL, supra note 6, at 4-5, 336. The ending of the Cold War not only
created an opportunity to reevaluate militarism, it also sparked hope among some
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this question, and thus perhaps defeats this hope, by suspending a regime
of rights that exemplifies and vitalizes precisely this transition within
Western culture. And what the Bush Administration has shown the
world, beyond any question, is precisely as Jiirgen Habermas observes:
"The behavior of the American government admits only one conclusion,
namely, that from their point of view international law is finished as a
medium for resolving conflicts between states and for promoting
democracy and human rights. 95
The judiciary, through its antiseptic process jurisprudence, may thus
collaterally sanction international lawlessness in the name of democratic
forbearance. When we speak of judicial deference to the democratic
branches of our government in times of war, we mean, in practical terms,
that war operates as a constraint on civil liberties, a limitation on it. War
does not silence law insofar as certain constitutional rules of
governmentality are concerned-that much Hamdi assures us, 96 to much
acclaim; but war may silence law insofar as certain individual liberties
and rights may be dispensed with through a recalibration of the securityliberty balance. So, when the Court defers to the Executive in its
decision to detain enemy combatants pursuant to the AUMF, and thus
approves of Yaser Hamdi's detention without the judicial process that a
criminal defendant would receive, it uses the war on terror as a silencing
of-a constraint, a boundary, on-our commitment to a form of due
process that characterizes what we long thought was the paradigm
mechanism for justifying involuntary detentions of U.S. citizens. The
alternative would be to flip the whole thing on its head and make civil
liberties a constraint on how the Executive can prosecute a war. That is
to say, law could operate to silence war, or at least contribute to the
silencing of war. But that anti-deference approach would put the
judiciary outside the antiseptic process framework, and there is little
chance of accomplishing that. Hamdi (and the more recent case of
Hamdan) confirms that assessment of our present jurisprudential
consciousness.
Ah, jurisprudential consciousness. Judicial deference to the
Executive in matters of foreign affairs and warmaking indeed has a
strong hold on our jurisprudential consciousness. 97 That hold on our
democratic theorists for a reinvestigation into the moral foundations of our democratic
institutions. See THOMAS PANGLE, THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY 2 (1992) ("[A]s the
threat from Marxist-inspired tyranny diminishes, we in the West shall have to confront
more and more squarely the problematic status of our moral foundations.").
95. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 103.
96. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36.
97. See generally Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981) ("the generally
accepted view [is] that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the
Executive"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936)
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jurisprudential consciousness reflects an understanding of sovereignty
that silently propels the Hamdi narrative forward, a fact hinted at by the
evocative first line of the opinion that this Nation faces a "difficult
time." 98 Guantanamo-understoodas the expression of sovereignty as
violence unchained from juridical restraints-cannot exist in a juridicopolitical scheme of divisible power. Sovereignty of this sort, it has long
been understood, must be exercised through the power of the state that is
indivisible. 99 The crux of this form of sovereignty-the way it is
expressed through the mechanics of governmentality-is the legislative
power. 10 0 And lo and behold, it is the wording of a congressional
enactment, the AUMF, that anchors the legal analysis in Hamdi. It is the
legislative power that gives Legality its prime role as lead character in
the Hamdi narrative. But, as this article has suggested and will pursue as
an animating theme, this jurisprudential consciousness depends,
crucially, on the unquestioned (and unquestionable) supposition that our
nation acts only in self-defense when it comes to our use of military
violence. Most discussions of Executive power in matters of foreign
affairs and warmaking partake in the unquestioned assumption that the
nation's warmaking is defensive, not aggressive, that we are protecting
democracy, not pursuing empire, and indeed that judicial deference is
vital because otherwise the very survival of this nation would otherwise
be imperiled.10 1
Whether the justifications for judicial deference are meritorious is
beside the point when we confront, as an open question, the possibility
that a pax Americana vision is fueling this era of permanent warfaresomething the judiciary is simply unwilling to do, judging from Hamdi
and Hamdan. This unwillingness is another manifestation of the human
inclination at the heart of the proposition that the stories we want to tell
ourselves dictate the stories that we do tell. But, nevertheless, it is still
worth commenting on a central justification for judicial deference-the
claim of Executive expertise when it comes to foreign policy 102
because it spotlights a crucial shallowness in Hamdi.
The shallowness of Hamdi at the level of legal doctrine ultimately
rests with the judiciary's obsession with "demonstrat[ing] its neutrality
(dicta expressing views about presidential power to conduct foreign affairs).
98. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
99. See SCHELL, supra note 6, at 282.
100. Id. at 283.
101. Added to all this is a secondary assumption, equally unquestioned, one that will
be taken up in Part Two of this two-part series: that our democratic institutions and our
citizenry are robust enough and well-equipped to handle the quandaries of this so-called
war on terror.
102. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The JudicialPower and Treaty Delegation, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1263, 1301 (2002).
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by adapting to the new order as it had supported the old."' 10 3 The
mutually reinforcing notions that the judiciary must defer to the
executive and legislative branches because democratic commitments
command that deference and because the executive has the expertise in
foreign affairs are presented as if they were neutral facts, if not self
evident. The non-neutrality of this deferential stance stems not only
from the disturbing possibility that our democracy is tangibly and deeply
debilitated, and that the executive branch is hardly populated with people
who have any genuine expertise in foreign affairs; more profoundly, the
deferential stance is a masquerade for power, for a commitment to a
particular mode of life, and ultimately for a particular way of being and
thinking.
Philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre, in his classic work After Virtue,
debunks the idea of managerial expertise, revealing it to be a fictional
notion.104 Foreign-policy expertise, like so-called managerial expertise,
is also a fictional notion, something manufactured to facilitate the pursuit
of a goal; in this case, the manufacturing of the notion of "foreign policy
expertise" facilitated America's post-World War 1I quest for a particular
global order enforced through unrivaled American military might.'0 5
"Foreign policy" is not something about which one can have actual
expertise, if by expertise we mean the ability to make meaningful causeand-effect judgments and predictions. Foreign policy is not a thing, but
is rather an expression and commitment to a particular way of living,
which is why deferring to so-called "foreign policy experts" is a way 1of6
committing to a normative vision of the world and our role in it. 0
103. SHKLAR, supra note 48, at 11 ("When constitutional and social changes have
become inevitable and settled, the judiciary adapts itself to the new order." Id. at 10.).
104.

See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 107 (2d ed. 1984) ("[T]he realm of

managerial expertise is one in which what purport to be objectively-grounded claims
function in fact as expressions of arbitrary, but disguised, will and preference.").
105. The notion of "foreign policy expertise" arose at the same time that the national
security bureaucracy developed and grew. National security, as a concept and rhetorical
device, surfaced after World War II when American power was being used increasingly
in regions far from the homeland. See generally DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE
ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (1977).

106. For more on this line of thought, see MACINTYRE, supra note 104. Maclntyre
argues in luxurious detail that our culture's valorization of managerial expertise rests
upon a "moral fiction," id. at 76, a "theatre of illusions," id. at 77. What Maclntyre
reveals about managerial expertise can just as well be said about "foreign-policy
expertise." Both forms of "expertise" are "illusion[s]" that operate in a "realm . . . in
which what purport[s] to be objectively-grounded claims function in fact as expressions
of arbitrary, but disguised, will and preference." Id. at 107. The ramifications of the
fiction of managerial expertise are true for the fiction of foreign-policy expertise,
ramifications that can only be described in terms of "how in the social world of
corporations and governments private preferences are advanced under the cover of
identifying the presence or absence of the findings of experts." Id. Cf ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA

UNGER,
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Deference in the service of a moral fiction like "foreign-policy expertise"
is simply a way to abjure the hard work of thinking substantively about
rights and obligations and of confronting genuine life-and-death matters.

All this brings me to an irreverent proposal, articulated here, in
sketchy form, more as a thought experiment than as an aspiration. What
may be worth considering, should we care to take Zizek's question
seriously, is a clean-hands doctrine overlaying the process jurisprudence
on display in Hamdi (and, with greater ardor, in Hamdan). The
Executive would have to show, under this doctrine, its entitlement to
judicial deference-that is, its entitlement to have war as a constraint on
civil liberties-through proof that its use of military force, including the
detention and treatment of enemy combatants, complies with, at the very
least, international treaties to which the United States is bound. An
aggressive and expansive clean-hands doctrine would include less
binding international norms as well (such as customary international
law). Unclean hands would mean that existing legal frameworks
protecting civil liberties (notably, for our purposes here, the paradigm
regime of rights associated with our criminal process)
would be a
10 7
constraint on how the illegal war could be pursued.
So, the clean-hands doctrine would add a caveat to what Justice
Breyer said in Hamdan. Recall that he concurred in the Court's decision
to strike down the Bush Administration's military-commission regime
for trying suspected Al Qaeda operatives. 0 8 He explained that the
Hamdan holding fit within our tradition and institutions of democracy:
(1998). Unger argues that "[i]nstitutional debates and experiments are not a separate and
subsidiary exercise; they represent our most important way of defining and redefining the
content of our ideals and interests." Id. Debating foreign policy is likewise not an
incursion into a privileged realm of so-called experts. It represents precisely the same
sort of endeavor to "defin[e] and redefin[e] the content of our ideals and interests." Id.
See also id. at 255.
107. Yaser Hamdi would have had a clean-hands claim, since the United States'
bombing of Afghanistan, pursued without the approval of the Security Council, was
illegal under international law. The United States likely would have received Security
Council backing, had it sought such backing. This bypassing of international law set the
stage for the ensuing series of actions that mark this country's clear repudiation of the
notion that we are beholden to any form of legality when it comes to the use of military
force. Guantanamo is a product of the illegality of the Afghanistan bombing campaign
and the stunning acquiescence of the American people to that illegality. Had there been a
demand for legality in this instance, a demand that we comply with international law in
what many regarded as a justifiable use of force, then the debacle in Iraq, and the
outrageous human rights abuses in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, might have been
averted.
108. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).

AFTER THE GOLD RUSH-PART I

2007]

Where... no emergency prevents consultation with Congress,
judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our
Nation's ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence
strengthens the Nation's ability to determine-through democratic
in those
means-how best to do so. The Constitution places its faith
19
0
democratic means. Our Court today simply does the same.

What are we to say if "that consultation" between the Executive and
Congress amounts to a quest to embark on something illegal-a
conspiracy, if you will? It may be too much to ask the judicial branch to
put a stop to that quest, but this clean-hands proposal offers the view that
the Supreme Court, as the last arbiter of judicial rights, ought not permit
the bypassing of adjudicatory rights to facilitate the pursuit of that illegal
quest. A full explication of this clean-hands doctrine is unnecessary for
our purposes, because the thought experiment I invite is to articulate why
our nation, for the foreseeable future, would never pursue a path to
develop such a doctrine. I surmise that this thought experiment, if
honestly pursued, would illuminate how deep our commitment is to a
mythological and dangerous American exceptionalism. 110

There is more to say about this proposal, but before doing so, it is
worth dwelling for a moment on how the rhetorical strategies at work in
Hamdi are reminiscent of the rhetorical strategies in a far different case,
McCleskey v. Kemp,' the (in)famous capital punishment case where the
Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a death sentence
109.

Id.

110. Regarding the assessment that America is unwilling to even consider a cleanhands doctrine, consider what may be the outer limits of mainstream criticism of how we
are fighting the so-called war on terror. Joseph Margulies, the author of the excellent
book Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power, harshly rebukes the Bush
Administration for the unconscionable abuses at the Guantanamo detention facilities. See
Professor Margulies uses a metaphor of a spatially
MARGULIES, supra note 26.
disoriented airplane pilot to explain why our government would descend into barbaric
human rights violations in the name of defending against future terrorism. Id. at 223-24.
Pilots who are spatially disoriented court disaster when they rely on their piloting
instincts rather than trust the flight instruments. Id. at 223. In the fog of war, Margulies
suggests, political actors are "trapped in a tightening spiral of wartime hysteria" and thus,
akin to the foolhardy pilot, rely on untrustworthy instinct to defend against a dangerous
enemy. Id. This way of conceptualizing what has gone wrong in how we have
responded to 9/11 strips away history, culture, economics, hegemonic politics, everything
that might give us a thick description of what has gotten us to this place in history. It is a
form of self-understanding that would insulate every nation from critique. The mythos of
American exceptionalism, however, grants us, but no other nation, this way of
inoculating ourselves from judgment.
111. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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rooted in statistical evidence showing that the likelihood of a Georgia
murderer getting a death sentence increases considerably if the murder
victim is white. 112 Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner dissect the
McCleskey opinion to uncover the following overarching rhetorical
strategy. 313 Whereas Warren McCleskey's constitutional challenge
1 14
asserts a mere risk that his death sentence was tainted by racial bias,
the import of that challenge is to undercut the very foundation of our
criminal justice edifice, which is the exercise of discretion.H 5 Removed
from the analysis is the crux of the matter-namely, the importance of
racial equality in America, particularly in the context of capitalpunishment litigation, since racism is most potent when it comes to the
death penalty.1 16 Racial equality is removed from the legal analysis by
the rhetorical maneuver of "put[ting] it on a wholly different ontological
plane" than the other ingredients in the constitutional balancing that is
taking place in the McCleskey opinion-namely, the apparent risk of
racial bias infecting the death-penalty decisionmaking, as revealed by the
statistical evidence, versus the absolute essentialness of discretion in our
criminal justice system which benefits everyone in the most concrete
way. "17
'
Racial equality becomes ephemeral, not quite real, in this
strategy of placing it on another ontological plane. It is merely an
aspiration, a species of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s inspirational dream, but
nonetheless something that hits up against reality. l8 In the rhetorical
universe of McCleskey, we can strive for racial equality, but we must
reckon with the harsh and inescapable reality that communities count on
our criminal-justice system to protect them.119
Something similar is happening in Hamdi. World peace, with the
United States abiding by international law and welcoming its
enforcement against itself, just as it expects such enforcement against
other nations, is an aspiration, like racial equality; it is therefore also
ephemeral, unreal, a sort of pie-in-the-sky sentimentality of sandalwearing, placard-carrying peaceniks.
The dream of world peace
governed by international law, like the dream of racial equality, must
give way to the war-on-terror reality where nuclear proliferation and the
democratization of weapons of mass destruction threaten our very way of
life. So, any evidence of American exceptionalism, of pax Americana,
112.

See generally id.

113.

See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 202-16

(2000).
114.
115.

See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291-92.
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 113, at 203.

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 204.
See id.
See id.
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operating at the heart of our new Guantanamo reality, must suffer the
same fate as Warren McCleskey's statistical proof of racial bias: they
must give way to the necessity and essential rightness of American
violence.

As for the proposed clean-hands doctrine itself, it directly confronts
a hidden reality in this so-called war on terror-namely, that the
deployment of war-rhetoric is a producer of law. Then, in a form of
mutuality, the new production of law, of new legal regimes, serves as the
enabler of the so-called war on terror, making it no longer "so-called"
but real. The law, manufactured by the sovereign's power to announce
the state of exception, is what makes the war on terror real. And so, the
Hamdi Court's concession to the Executive of this power of ontology
when it comes to deeming individuals to be "enemy combatants" spills
out into an ever greater power of ontology, creating an entirely new
binary condition of "war" and "peace," that is itself a producer of a form
of legality that harbors within it a mode of sovereignty that has and will
continue to undercut the Enlightenment's key advances in our
conceptualizing of sovereignty.
To see what I mean, we might first understand the clean-hands
proposal as an implementation of what Habermas calls a "Kantian
conception of international law."' 20 That Kantian conception "allows for
the possibility that a superpower, assuming it has a democratic
constitution and acts with foresight and prudence, will not always
instrumentalize international law for its own ends but can promote a
project that ends up by tying its own hands."' 12' The clean-hands doctrine
would confront directly the implications of American exceptionalism and
this nation's quest for empire by demanding judicial interference with the
political branches' management of military violence when established
adjudicatory rights are implicated. In short, illegality in the global arena
cannot generate a state of exception that renders legal the suspension of
adjudicatory rights that institutionalize the values in our constitutional
democracy. Law, one might say, limits war (especially the onset of
"permanent" war) rather than war (especially "permanent" war) limiting
law.
It should be made explicit that this clean-hands proposal is not
predicated on the view that the Constitution, through the Supremacy

120.

HABERMAS,

121.

Id.

supra note 2, at 150.
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Clause, directs the President to comply with international law. 122 Nor
does it hinge on the hotly contested question, what role should
internationallaw play in the interpretation of domestic law?123 So, the
judiciary may not have the power-and perhaps ought not have the
power-to stop this nation from undertaking an illegal war (i.e., a war of
aggression, as opposed to a war in genuine self defense), or from
engaging in illegal methods in prosecuting a war. What the clean-hands
proposal does is impose upon the judiciary, in those instances of our
nation's illegal warmaking conduct under international law, the
obligation to remain true to the legal regime that vindicates the
Constitution's Bill of Rights, which means the obligation to enforce
those core adjudicatory rights that express and institutionally implement
our nation's core values, even when Congress authorizes the Executive
to bypass the institutional mechanisms that exist to enforce and vindicate
24

those rights. 1

This means, just to invoke one example, no judicial sanctioning of
military commissions along the lines of the Military Commission Act of
2006 when our deployment of military force amounts to an illegal war of
aggression. If Hamdan adds to the anti-blank check holding of Hamdi
'
by raising the "transaction costs for the making of policy in wartime,"125
122. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d
ed. Columbia Univ. Press 1979); David Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law,
and the Constitution: A Frankian-MadisonianApproach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
363, 364 (2003); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate
InternationalLaw Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees,43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 855-56 (2005). But see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).

123. See Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail
Party of InternationalLaw: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign
and International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 507 (2006). Thus, the clean-hands
proposal implies nothing with regard to the debate over international law's rightful role in
constitutional adjudication, provoked by and arising in such cases as Roper v.Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), insofar as that debate
focuses on the legitimacy of using international law to help interpret the meaning and
scope of our own Constitution. It may be the case that Roper, especially, can be
inspirational in developing the clean-hands proposal, because Roper gestures at the idea
that criminality by juveniles often implicate the failings of the community and the society
at large, which is a form of clean-hands reasoning. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-75. The
community loses its entitlement to inflict a certain type of punishment because it has
failed in its obligations towards the convicted defendant. See id.
124. Cf Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291
U.S. 138, 158-61 (1934) (Congress may not have authority to exempt U.S. from
international legal obligations). See also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE L.J. 1601, 1621 n. 48 (1986) ("A judge may or may not be able to change the deeds
of official violence, but she may always withhold the justification for this violence.")
[hereinafter Cover, Violence].
125. Julian G. Ku & John C. Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Casefor
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT 179, 215
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then the clean-hands doctrine would essentially increase those
transaction costs much higher by insisting that military adventures
comply with basic and universal international norms, particularly the
norm that no country engage in military aggression.

I offer this clean-hands doctrine as a thought experiment rather than
as a serious proposal because, I submit, the evidence regrettably
demonstrates that we as a nation are unwilling to submit ourselves to a
regime of legality when it comes to global affairs. If we were willing, it
might be possible to answer the obvious objection to the clean-hands
proposal-namely, that issues of foreign policy are for the Executive and
are not properly juridical concerns-with the claim that our ominous
global crisis, and the menacing future it portends, demands an overhaul
of our notion of what is properly a juridical concern. Scholars, lawyers
and jurists may quarrel mightily over whether Guantanamo-style
detention should be subject to judicial oversight, but the quarrel will
always have a sterile quality if the notion of what is subject to judicial
oversight is treated as a fixed given-sterile in the most practical sense
that the judiciary is shut down from actually investigating what is going
on out there in the world. Whether a practice falls within a particular
category may be a worthy question to ask, but sometimes the practice
itself forces upon us the more fundamental question of whether the
categorizations themselves are valid. The practice of Guantanamo-style
detention can never provoke a genuine questioning of our notion of what
is properly a juridical concern so long as we as a nation remain unwilling
to submit ourselves to a regime of legality in global affairs.
Students of history will see that our unwillingness to submit to
international legality, that our understanding of sovereignty as indivisible
power, characterizes the days of Woodrow Wilson's futile efforts to win
approval of his League of Nations proposal-a proposal very much in
line with what Kant expressed in his well-known essay, Perpetual
Peace.126 The U.S. Senate in Wilson's day could not abide the idea that
international legality would abrogate Congress's constitutional power to
declare war, for that would rupture the indivisibility of sovereignty
(expressed in terms of legislative power). The right to use violence to
achieve political ends is a sovereign right, the anti-League position

(2006).
126.

See Immanuel Kant, Toward a PerpetualPeace, in IMMANUEL KANT, PRACTICAL

330 (Mary Gregor ed. and trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1795). This
text is also availableat http://www.constitution.org/kant/perpeace.htm.
PHILOSOPHY
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insisted, and thus not to be rendered divisible through some globalized
social contract that would tame the state of nature that characterizes the
environment in which nations interact with each other. 127 The irony, of
course, is that the United States Constitution is radical precisely in the
way that it overcame the notion that a nation could only express its
sovereignty through a state of indivisible powers, thus exemplifying a
new understanding of sovereignty predicated on divided powers. The
question for the Senate faced with Wilson's advocacy for the League of
Nations, and the question that my clean-hands proposal raises now, is
whether this new understanding of sovereignty can be globalized.
Aside from this theoretical question, there was also the concrete
impediment that undercut Wilson's advocacy and that remains with us
today: submitting to international legality, in a post-World War I world,
entailed the virtually unthinkable thought of dismantling an empirebuilding system that Europe still clung to and that the United States was
rapidly acquiring a taste for; that dismantling was simply not something
an Enlightenment culture, infected with the virus of racism and beholden
28
to the dark impulse to control and dominate, was willing to accept.
We as a nation have advanced very little, if at all, beyond this nationalist
stance; it seems, judging from the 2002 National Security Strategy
document, we have become more devoted to empire, and thus more
nationalistic in our repudiation of the Wilsonian ideal of international
legality. The clean-hands doctrine could never take hold in such a
society because it essentially takes the Wilsonian ideal a step further: not
only would our nation's warmaking power be justiciable in some
international tribunal, but our own judiciary would have the obligation to
investigate the legality of it as well.
This judicial demand for clean hands, for American submission to
and compliance with international norms-most especially, the
renunciation of aggressive military actions-necessarily entails no longer
treating as definitional the notion that the United States never acts
aggressively, but only defensively. Treating that question as a problem
of fact, rather than just a matter of definition, is a necessary first step
toward seeing that clean hands warrants juridical (and thus, civic)
attention. The upshot is that this proposal would help protect our core
constitutional values against rapid erosion that will surely ensue in this
era of permanent warfare. It also would enforce the idea that "one
cannot achieve 'justice between nations' through moralization but only
through juridification of international relations."' 129 It would demonstrate
127.
128.
129.

SCHELL, supra note 6, at 275-80.
See id. at 271-72.
HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 105.
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our genuine commitment to the rule of law and would be one strong step
in remedying a deep flaw in the United Nations, which is its dependence
on countries like the United States that pursue their own national
interests despite global ramifications that threaten human survival.
More broadly, the judiciary's deployment of a clean-hands doctrine
would contribute to the vital need that the American public develops a
global consciousness where legality, not naked military might, is the
medium of international relations. It would promote "an emergent global
public sphere that mobilizes the conscience and political participation of
citizens all over the world, because 'violations of law in one place of the
earth are felt in all.'" 30 Lest the warmaking proclivities of the Executive
are put in check by some juridical imposition of a legality framework on
United States actions in our new globalization reality, there is little
reason to be optimistic that we will continue to have the blessings of
living in a society governed by a regime of rights that we have heretofore
largely taken for granted.
But that may well be the least of it. It is fashionable to say, as a
justification for curtailing or even overriding the demands of liberty, that
our Constitution is not a suicide pact. 13' It is the specter of weakening
our "national security," and thus putting our nation in jeopardy, that
prompts the call for sober realism against the idealistic quest to preserve
civil liberties. But it may be that the converse is more apt. The rhetoric
of "national security" to mask the pursuit of particular global designs and
the abdication of foreign policy to the so-called "experts," as the source
for Guantanamo, may be the true threat to civil liberties and legality
itself. It may be a textual fact that the Constitution instructs the judiciary
to defer such matters to the Executive and Legislative branches. But if
the quest for empire is what ultimately threatens this nation, then the
siren call that "the Constitution is not a suicide pact" should be in the
service of unshackling the judiciary from this catastrophic deference to
the Executive.
A clean-hands doctrine in the hands of a judiciary willing to
promote serious dialogue and argument about globalization and
America's quest for empire through military force may be an essential
component to human survival. For, as Jonathan Schell summarizes the
situation, a neo-imperialism leaves the entire planet in peril, not just the
idea of Legality:
A policy of unchallengeable military domination over the earth,
accompanied by a unilateral right to overthrow other governments by
military force, is an imperial, an Augustan policy.... [I]f the
130.
131.

Id. at 126 (quoting Kant, Toward a PerpetualPeace, supra note 126).
See Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
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wealthy and powerful use globalization to systematize and exacerbate
exploitation of the poor and the powerless; if the poor and the
powerless react with terrorism and other forms of violence; ... and if

the United States continues to pursue
an Augustan policy, then the
32
stage will be set for catastrophe.'
All the quibbling about Executive powers vis a vis the power of
Congress reduces to just that-quibbling-when we confront this harsh
reality. The reality is sufficiently dire-that is, the threat to the hopedfor juridification of global relations is sufficiently pressing, for a
permanent state of global civil war is rapidly descending upon us-that
those who argue that the Framers would never countenance a judiciary
intruding into vital matters of war and peace should bear the burden of
proving that the Framers would not be sufficiently alarmed by our pax
Americana and by the palpably degraded public sphere within American
society to reconsider their conviction that the sovereignty-in-the-people
principle demands judicial deference to the political branches. The
Framers could never have contemplated a global order such as the one
we seem to be inhabiting, where this nation unabashedly is pursuing
empire in a "globalization" world dominated by multinational
corporations and met with resistance in many forms, with jihadist
terrorism being the most visible, and, needless to say, the most odious.
So much ink is spilled (wasted?) over what the Framers have
contemplated about who has the power to do what, when it comes to
military pursuits-an inquiry that thrusts us into seventeenth and
eighteenth-century political philosophy-but precious little over what
those pursuits really are in the here-and-now, in this darkness of the
twenty-first century, and whether our judicial institutions, through
proceduralist analytical infighting, should be agnostic about the
sacrificing of fundamental rights to engage in those pursuits. 133 Are we
equipped as a democratic polis--do we have a vibrant enough
democratic culture-to confront this harsh reality and get beyond empty
slogans about "national security?" Hamdi as a narrative construct, a
cultural document which serves as a microcosm of our cultural state of
affairs, does not promise a rosy answer to that question.

132. SCHELL, supra note 6, at 329.
133. In this "difficult time for our Nation," and with our degraded public sphere, it
may be true, as Hannah Arendt argued, that the entire quandary over the separation of
powers is at best irrelevant, and more likely simply a facilitator for greater assertions of
sovereignty: "the principle of the separation of power... actually provides a kind of
mechanism, built into the very heart of government, through which new power is
constantly generated .. " HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 150 (Viking Press 1969)
(1963).
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PART Two

IV. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld as Narrative Construct
Let us now examine Hamdi v. Rumsfeld not so much as a legal
opinion (we will not run away from that fact), but more so as a narrative
construction and as a cultural document within a teetering Enlightenment
age. What do I mean?
We already have a taste of what I am gesturing at when I refer to
our teetering Enlightenment age. We will, of course, come back to this
idea for greater amplification.
But as to the idea of narrative
construction, I have in mind Robert Cover's entwining of law and
narrative:
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning....

[L]aw and narrative

are inseparably related. Every prescription is insistent in its demand
to be located in discourse-to be supplied with history and destiny,
beginning and end, explanation and purpose. And every 134
narrative is
insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral.
This discussion of Hamdi takes Cover's proposition about law and
narrative to include the most concrete instance of legal discourse, the
crafting of judicial opinions, because, whatever else Cover is saying
here, he must be insisting upon a claim that every legal opinion has an
"unconscious," just as all literature does. Legal opinions are more than
what a Justice happens to put down on paper, for the meaning of a legal
opinion, like a novel or short story, is produced by a joint enterprise
between reader and author. That joint enterprise is replete with
assumptions drawn from our shared culture, politics, and mythology.
Because the project of this article is to get inside this joint enterprise, we
will not decipher reasons or conjure arguments as to who is right and
who is wrong in the four opinions set forth in Hamdi. It may be the case
that the presentation here may have implications for that issue. But this
article is not intended to identify them. Seeing a judicial opinion-and I
take the word seeing very seriously here-as a narrative construct, with
rhetorical maneuvers to accomplish narrative ambitions, can "mak[e] the
already familiar strange again."' 135 And that is a worthy upshot of seeing,
for, as Ludwig Wittgenstein put it, "[t]he aspects of things that are most
important for us are hidden because of their ... familiarity ... [and thus]

we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most
134.

Cover, Forward,supra note 1, at 4-5 (citations omitted).

135.

AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, SUpra note 113, at 1.
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powerful."'' 36 This project of de-familiarization will provoke questions,
very provocative but necessary questions, about where we are heading in
this condition we are in as a nation-a condition I call, our "9/11
anxieties."
What drives this particular narrative forward is the belief that
Hamdi does not just exist within, or even just contributes to shaping, a
larger system of jurisprudential understanding of procedural due process.
One aspect of the project here is to understand the discourse of rights as
more than a process of legitimating sovereign power (which is the
traditional conceptualization), but to apprehend how that discourse
produces consciousness or reinforces an existing consciousness.137 In
that vein, it would be unduly limiting to understand Hamdi-and to
applaud it-as a case where legal rights enter into a juridical calculus
that ultimately limits the prerogatives of sovereignty. The project here
aims to open ourselves to the fact that Hamdi, as an exemplar in what we
might call war-on-terror jurisprudence, facilitates and produces a
consciousness and nomos that ought to be interrogated. And so the
discussion that follows treats Hamdi as a justificatory document where
law and narrative combine, as a text that is more than a piece of legal
138
rhetoric, for it signals and helps to create "a world in which we live.,
Perhaps it signals and mutely expresses how our 9/11 anxieties bespeak
our uncertainty about the nomos we live in, the normative universe
within which our legal discourse operates and which that discourse helps
shape.
Robert Cover says that "[t]o inhabit a nomos is to know how to live
in it.' ' 139 If that is so, and I believe it to be so, then it must be true that
the Hamdi opinion can be evaluated and interrogated according to a
yardstick beyond the doctrinal, beyond the constitutional, that it can be
regarded as speaking to something larger than the legal issue it purports
to resolve. It may be, to continue on with Cover's insight, that lurking
within the shadowy regions of Hamdi, we can sense that perhaps we do
not yet know how to live in our nomos because, within our collective
psyche, 9/11 destroyed the one we thought we knew and is thus now
forcing us to forge a new one. Perhaps that is partly what we mean when
we partake in the mantra that 9/11 changed everything. For many
suffering people throughout the world, 9/11 provoked a welcome-to-theclub reaction-some sorrowful, some gleeful-and that new
136.

LUDWIG

WITTGENSTEIN,
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INVESTIGATIONS
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Anscombe trans., 1953).
137. For a good discussion of the role of consciousness in social and legal analysis,
see UNGER, supra note 32, at 107-19.

138.
139.

Cover, Forward,supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 6.
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membership, to them, is the most significant change brought about on
that day.' 40 Americans do not-cannot?-see it that way. It may be,
then, that Hamdi is but a part of an unfinished rickety bridge to some
mystery place on the other side, a place familiar and strange at the same
time.
V.

This "Difficult Time in Our Nation's History"

The Hamdi opinion opens with the observation that we face a
"difficult time in our Nation's history."' 141 This observation is not an
analytical point of departure or a declaration needing investigation. In
one sense, it establishes the mood of, the backdrop to, the opinion's
analysis; it functions as a "display of tellability" where the reader's
attention is enlisted "by connecting the tale being told to the occasion of
the telling."' 142 It is eye-catching and dire, as it must be, since it
foreshadows that some departure from a legal norm is to take place and
will need to be justified through law. In another, related sense, this
reference to a "difficult time" calls to mind "necessity," that great engine
of ingenuity and progress, the mother of invention, as we have all learned
as children. The Enlightenment arose from necessity, the need for the
individual to break the bondage of superstition and the authority of
tradition. 143 And the embrace of rationality that lies at the heart of that
heritage is uniquely suited to confronting the endless challenges and
obstacles that present themselves as necessities. Our scientific and
technological achievements, the fruits of our Enlightenment heritage,
arose from our confrontations with an unending stream of perceived
necessities. The flip-side of necessity is control, the grand payoff for
Enlightenment rationality: to gain control is to overcome necessity. The
means-ends rationality that characterizes a large facet of our
Enlightenment heritage is a product of modernity's confrontation with
necessity.

140. French thinker Jean Baudrillard surmised that the devastation of the World Trade
Center tapped into the deep recesses of the Western psyche. "We have dreamed of this
event," Baudrillard said, "because nobody can fail to dream of the destruction of any
power that has become hegemonic to that degree." Jean Baudrillard, L'esprit du
terrorisme, LE MONDE, Nov. 3, 2001, in JONATHAN BARKER, THE NO-NONSENSE GUIDE
TO TERRORISM 16 (2003). Some government leaders, facing armed resistance within their
own countries, found an opportunity in the 9/11 attacks to intensify their responses to
those resistance forces in the name of fighting "terrorism." See Ahmed Rashid, They're
Only Sleeping: Why Militant Islamists in Central Asia Aren't Going to go Away, THE
NEW YORKER, Jan. 14, 2002.
141. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
142. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 113, at 148.
143. See Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, ETHICS:
SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH 305-08 (ed. Paul Rabinow 1994).
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Necessity is crucial to law. One might say that necessity has 1no
44
law, but the better formulation is that "necessity creates its own law.
It is hard to find a better illustration of this adage than the very creation
of the term enemy combatant and the ensuing jurisprudence of military
commissions and enemy-combatant detentions. 145 International law does
not recognize the term "enemy combatant," which is precisely why the
Bush Administration created it. Necessity, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales advised the President, demands that we jettison the constraints
of the Geneva Convention in "this new paradigm [of war]," which entails
jettisoning the international-law lexicon of lawful and unlawful
combatants and creating the entirely new category of "enemy combatant"
that is beyond the reach of international law. 146 So, this "difficult time,"
this necessity, creates a juridical vacuum which the sovereign seeks to fill
by a new category in the law, that of enemy combatant. One available
task for the Hamdi Court was to decide whether to resist the creation of
this new ontology. And whether it would take on that ontological issue
undoubtedly depended on
what the Court meant when it said this Nation
147
time."'
"difficult
a
faces
What, precisely, is the "difficulty" or the true nature of the necessity
that generates the legal controversy in Hamdi is unmentioned at this
early point in the narrative. O'Connor simply declares that we are within
a "difficult time"-not simply faced with, but within, meaning we may
not avoid our reckoning with this "difficult time," but are obligated to
confront it.148 Is the "difficulty" trying to preserve liberty against an
overreaching Executive? Is it the brute reality that we must now worry
about mass killing in the Homeland? Is it that we are on a mission to
stamp out terrorists, a mission global in scope? Is the "difficulty" our
need to redefine ourselves and our role in the world? Whatever it might
mean, the reference to "difficult time," undefined and evocative, surely
signals the pressure to situate this case outside the normal paradigm of
legality, which in this case is the criminal adjudicatory process, the
144.

AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 24. See generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Rhetoric of

Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson 's PintersequeConversation), 40 GA. L. REv. 779 (2006);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1257
(2004); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?,112 YALE L. J. 1011 (2003).

145. "The military commission, a tribunal neither mentioned in the Constitution nor
created by statute, was born of military necessity." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749, 2772-73 (2006).
146. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales on the Decision Re Application of the
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban to
President George Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), in MARK DANNER,
AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

147.
148.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
Id.

TORTURE AND TRUTH:

83-84 (2004).
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vitalizing institutional embodiment of our Enlightenment heritage.
And this pressure to situate this case outside the normal criminal
adjudicatory process further signals that the Court will not impede the
sovereign's power to create a new legal category, enemy combatant, and
that it will not consider the deeper implication of that fact-namely, that
the United States seeks to assert a form of sovereignty beyond the
juridical constraints of international law. We know the outcome to this
narrative drama already: Guantanamo-as-detention-facility for "enemy
combatants" will ultimately receive legal approval. But what we might
note immediately is that Guantanamo-as-detention-facility is not beyond
the law, or outside the law, or an exception to the law. For the effect of
Hamdi is that the sovereign has succeeded in asserting itself-and that is
the irreducible core of sovereignty, the assertion of power over
individual subjects-and has thus remade itself, through the operation of
American jurisprudence. In fact, before Hamdi, and certainly after, an
entire legal regime has been constructed to infuse legality into the
enterprise of detaining enemy combatants. All the talk of Guantanamo
as a place of lawlessness is therefore incomplete-and hence,
produced by a
misleading. It is a place bubbling with law-law
49
1
time.
difficult
phrase,
the
in
captured
necessity
Note that O'Connor does not assert outright, to infuse added weight
to the phrase difficult time, that we are in a "war," though she will broach
that subject later in the opinion with overt timidity. For now, there is no
suggestion that the issues presented in this case revolve around that
essential fact. Perhaps this is so because, on one level, "difficult time"
cannot equate with "war." Not because war is so exceptional, so horrible
and horrifying, that it transcends the restrained locution of "difficult
time." Rather, the opposite is true: "difficult time" is far too somber, too
grave, to merely refer to something as prosaic as "war." Professor John
Yoo, an architect of and apologist for the Bush Administration's embrace
of torture as a tool of warfare, argues that we ought to reorient our
thinking about war and consider the benefits of going to war more
often. 150 "It is no longer clear," he writes, "that the default state for
American national security is peace.'' 1 5 As chilling as this argument is,
it traffics in the myth that military violence, war, is aberrational. Our
149. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006); Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, Military Order of 13 Nov. 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001). For Defense
detentions,
see
Guantanamo
documents
regarding
Department
See
also
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod.
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040213-0443.html.
150.

See John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REv.

793 (2004).
151. Id. at 816.
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"default state" is not peace. We are actually a militarized society, a
nation "founded on military conflict" and willing to "resort[]
frequently... to military force," a nation "at war or engaged in
significant military action for most of its corporate life."152 We are, then,
not unlike other empires, in which expansion and control-in particular,
control that permits access to certain natural and other economic
resources-is the dominant feature of our behavior as a nation, 153 a
nation which "can no longer insulate itself from the planet" and thus
"must, in effect, rule the planet," 154 and in that quest uses violence to
stamp out whatever impedes those global designs. 155
152.

Mark E. Brandon,

War and the American Constitutional Order,

CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY

IN THE

11 (Tushnet, ed.

2005). See Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces
Abroad, 1798-2004, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Oct. 5, 2004)
available at http://www.history.navy.mi/library/online/forces.htm (noting U.S. engaged
in military actions overseas since World War I every year except ten (excluding covert
operations, which have been abundant). Between 1989 and 1999, after the collapse of the
Soviet Union-that is, after the elimination of the supposed raison d'etre of our Cold
War militarization of American society-we engaged in forty-eight open military
interventions, with hardly a blip of dissent from a populace that takes for granted our use
of military might to manage a global system of commerce congenial to our consumerist
culture. See id.; see also HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at 177; BACEVICH, supra note 6,
at 74, 142-43, 167, 181; Andrew J. Bacevich, Policing Utopia: The Military Imperatives
of Globalization, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, (Summer 1999). For more on the deep roots
of our consumerist culture, roots that extend to the founding of the American republic,
see GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION ix (1993). The
intensity of our military needs and activities in a post-Cold War world exposes the canard
that the Cold War was about defending against a communist threat; it confirms that the
Cold War "strategy of containment" was actually a mechanism to situate the United
States within the center of a global economic order, enforced by its unrivaled military
superiority. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at 24 (Cold War as "moral
justification... for maintaining a permanent stasis of global order"). For more on the
U.S. containment strategy, see JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (1982). For a
critique of the canard that the Cold War was defensive in nature, rather than as a
convenient framework for global hegemony, see JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 17-20.
153. See ARENDT, supra note 13, at 125 ("Expansion as a permanent and supreme aim
of politics is the central political idea of imperialism."); BOAL, ET AL., supra note 11, at
93 ("[Tlhe US empire has followed a long and consistent strategic path-centered on and
driven by military engagement-to force regional penetration and exploit the existing or
resulting 'weak states.' And throughout this history, certainly no less so over the past
several decades, what passes for 'peace' has prefigured-has been structured to
prefigure-and endless series of wars.").
154. BARBER, supra note 6, at 67. See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 4 ("the United States
[is], in fact, a military juggernaut intent on world domination").
155. See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 113-57. See generally HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1980); WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY
OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (2d ed. W.W. Norton 1972) (1959); HUNT, supra note 62. We

are a people, I have come to believe, who cannot confront what our finest works of
literature have taught us, that our violence and three-centuries quest for dominance-over
the land of North America (known as the Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine),
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This means, at the very least, that O'Connor's reference to this
"difficult time in our Nation's history" cannot mean, at its core, that we
are engaged in a military conflict, for warring is a usual condition for us.
More than that, war does not, of itself, produce an exceptional state of
affairs; on the contrary, empires use war to produce stability in a global
order, which thus makes war a state of normality. 56 "War, in a word, is
modernity incarnate."' 157 So, "difficult time" cannot mean that we are
confronting a supreme emergency "where we exit the moral realm and
enter the harsh Hobbesian realm of pure survival"' 58-though the Bush
Administration rhetoric purportedly justifying torture and other extreme
measures often gives that impression.
The "difficulty" is something else, perhaps something deeper.
A.

Necessity and Law

The real danger is to see the so-called war on terror ahistorically,
and thus nationalistically, to see it as something new, as sui generis,
rather than as something along the lines of a fruition, a culmination
within our modernist heritage-or, at the very least, as a resurgence of
the manufactured permanent emergency this nation lived through during
the Cold War, a time in which we created a "national security

then over the entire expanse of the globe (known as Wilsonian idealism and the Open
Door Policy, and most recently expressed in the Bush Administration's 2002 National
Security Strategy), and ultimately over the heavens themselves (exemplified by our
NASA program and our concrete intentions to militarize space)-becomes sanctified at
the expense of an honest appraisal of who we are as a nation. For more on Manifest
Destiny and the Open Door Policy, see WILLIAMS, supra note 72. See also BERMAN,
supra note 4, at 107-08. For more on the relationship of the Open Door Policy and the
Cold War containment strategy, see GADDIS, supra note 152, at 61. For more on the
United States' ambition to militarize space, see JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 81 ("The Space
Command's policy statement, 'Vision for 2020,' argues that 'the globalization of the
world economy will continue, with a widening gulf between 'haves' and 'have-nots,' and
that the Pentagon's mission is therefore to 'dominate the space dimension of military
operations to protect U.S. interests and investments' in an increasingly dangerous and
implicitly anti-American world."); id. at 311.
156. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at 21 (war is a "foundation of politics itself,"
"a procedural activity and an ordering, regulative activity that creates and maintains
social hierarchies, a form of biopower aimed at the promotion and regulation of social
life"); id. at 39 (war is "an integral element of biopower, aimed at the construction and
reproduction of the global social order"). BOAL, ET AL., supra note 11, at 79 ("For war,
thus far in human history, has not been an 'other,' or optional, means of political conduct.
It has been what politics most fully and essentially is.").
157. BOAL, et al., supra note 11, at 79. What this means is that war expresses our
technical prowess, our reward for being a society and a culture that has nurtured itself on
modernity and the promise of Enlightenment rationality.
158. Daniel Statman, Moral Tragedies, Supreme Emergencies and National Defense,
23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 311, 315 (2006) (citation omitted).
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constitution. 1 59 Our "difficult time" speaks to the unleashing of
powerful impulses within our culture, Enlightenment impulses to control
and dominate,1 60 and more immediately, to bypass the cumbersome
obstacle course that we regard as the sine qua non of due process in order
to manage the phenomenon of "dangerousness." 9/11 has in effect given
us permission to do so. That permission expresses itself in the language
of necessity.
Opting for the abstract, the non-committal description, "difficult
time," gives O'Connor the ability to package her narrative to establish
necessity as the foundational juridical fact upon which the entire opinion
will be built. Necessity is both a problem and an opportunity. The
problem posed by an extreme necessity, arising from a state of
emergency, is rooted in the fact that we profess a commitment to the rule
of law, aspire to live by it within an institutional framework and milieu
that we label a democracy. Indeed, the very fact that it poses as a
problem, the fact that we are uncomfortable with the famous aphorism,
necessitas legem non habet-necessity has no law-attests to our
commitment to the rule of law. Necessitas legem non habet is probably
best taken to mean that circumstances may be so dire that an obligation
to follow a particular legal norm may be suspended to account for the
necessities of those circumstances. A totalitarian regime need suffer no
angst over the suspension of law to confront an emergency, since "law"
is embodied in, rather than a barrier to, the will of the ruler.
In a rule-of-law democracy, it is often assumed, Legality protects us
against the unleashing of the oppressive tendencies of the sovereign in a
time of necessity.1 61 No sophisticated observer of American legal history
would buy into that belief. As Bruce Ackerman put it while discussing
the likely panic that would ensue after the next (inevitable) terrorist

strike, "[t]he courts haven't protected us in the past, and they will do
worse in the future." 162 The best that might be said is that in a rule-oflaw democracy "[n]ecessity is not a source of law, nor does it properly
suspend the law; it merely releases a particular case from the literal

159. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).

160.

Jonathan Schell identifies, among many things, as an obstacle to moving towards

a genuinely more peaceful world the fact that "the dream of dominion has fresh allure in
the counsels of the powerful.. See SCHELL, supra note 6, at 10.
161. I use the term "legality" as a commitment to a system of rule-following. It
partakes of Judith Shklar's use of the term "legalism," which she defines as "the ethical
attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships
to consist of duties and rights determined by rules." SHKLAR, supra note 48, at 1.
Legality as rule-following is a supreme expression of our Enlightenment heritageindeed, it is that heritage's defining feature. See MACINTYRE, supra note 104, at 118-20.
162. ACKERMAN, supra, note 15, at 3.
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application of the norm."' 163 When Lincoln suspended Habeas Corpus, he
did so out of necessity, famously asking, "Are all the laws, but one, to go
unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be
violated?"' 164 The rhetorical thrust of that question was not that Legality
itself is illegitimate, or that the law ought not be observed, but rather that
the necessities of the particular case renders Legality itself momentarily
inapplicable. But regardless of the political system and culture of a
universe; and
particular nation, necessity creates a void in the juridical
65
like Nature herself, Sovereignty abhors a vacuum.
Therein is the opportunity. This vacuum created by necessity is the
source of opportunity that a state of emergency presents for the
sovereign. It is filled through the Legality that is manufactured pursuant
to the state of exception inaugurated by the necessity itself. Congress's
authorization to the Executive to use military force (the AUMF) is the
infusion of Legality into the vacuum created by an announced state of
emergency that came in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The birth
of the War on Terror thus came in the form of law. It is in this sense that
necessity is not outside of law, or suspends law, but instead creates the
conditions for a new legal regime to bloom through the acts of the
the seeds of law to take root.
sovereign. Necessity is the soil for 166
Necessity does not exempt. It produces.
Necessity produces law in that it is a juridical fact, meaning that
necessity is itself a state of affairs that exists according to a juridical
judgment. To decree that federal courts may not entertain habeas
petitions because necessity demands it is to speak in terms of law. 167 To
authorize indefinite detentions without a jury trial, as Hamdi sanctions, is
to act through law. To pass a law that allows torture is to remain true to
the rule of law (unless one insists, as a natural law adherent, upon a
semantic distinction between rule of law and rule by law). To decree a
state of affairs as constituting a state of necessity is to announce
something that has the force of law; it is a legal pronouncement, a
speech-act by the sovereign that a particular state of affairs cannot be
governed by ordinary norms (normal Legality) and that instead what
must be produced is another regime of norms that can govern the
emergency state of affairs implied by the juridical judgment of necessity.
163.

AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 25.

164. Lincoln, supra note 46, at 594.
165. See AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 31. See also id. at 42.
166. See Levinson, supra note 46, at 728 ("we should recognize the vitalizing role of
emergencies"). See also BUTLER, supra note 44, at 66 ("the rule of law, in the act of
being suspended, produces sovereignty in its action and as its effect") (emphasis in
original).
167. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006).
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But the juridical judgment of necessity is beyond Legality. There is no
legal framework to guide the sovereign's claim to necessity.168
What we can say here is that whatever is the necessity arising from
"this difficult time," it is not merely a product of some difficulty in
governance. Something more is being said here. We know that because
the stricken party, the character in this narrative who must endure this
"difficult time," is not a litigant or an institution, but the "Nation" itself.
It is a "difficult time" for the Nation, a character in its own right within
this narrative. A drama with an imperiled Nation undoubtedly suggests
that we are seized by an emergency moment where our current juridical
universe contains a lacuna that the sovereign must fill. 169 An emergency
moment is what we have, we surely understand, because our very
survival is at stake.
With this somber mood, infused with the
(hyperbolic?) innuendo of our Nation teetering on annihilation with
barbarians at the gate, with a world now gripped in a high-stakes drama
in which our ultimate cultural heritage, the Enlightenment, is under
siege, the Court is not merely presented with a set of legal issues. Nor is
it confronted with the task of merely smoothing over conflicts among
lower courts. Something grander is happening, and so the Court is
"called upon" to act, to take a stand, to enter into the drama of "this
difficult time." What is the Court "called upon" to do? Look at how
O'Connor frames the case:
[T]o consider the legality of the Government's detention of a United
States citizen on United States soil as an "enemy combatant" and to
address the process that is constitutionally owed to one who seeks to
challenge his classification as such.17 °
Let us observe three things from this framing of the issue.
First, can we doubt that the sovereign's power to detain so-called
"enemy combatants" will be affirmed? The "display of tellability"-this
"difficult time in our Nation's history"-makes the resolution of the
fundamental issue in Hamdi inevitable, the fundamental issue being the
legalization of Guantanamo,a term I use in italicized form to distinguish
it from the place we know as Guantanamo Bay. Guantanamo refers not
to a place, but on one level to our nation's willingness-commitment,
even-to inflict unimaginable suffering upon individuals with the
168.
AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 30 ("Not only does necessity ultimately come down
to a decision, but that on which it decides is, in truth, something undecidable in fact and
law.").
169. See id. at 31 ("[T]he state of necessity is... interpreted as a lacuna in public
law, which the executive power is obligated to remedy.").
170. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
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skimpiest of proof that they merit such torture. 171 On another level, as
stated earlier, Guantanamo is a shorthand gesture to a form of
sovereignty that harkens back to the late sixteenth century, in which
sovereign power rests ultimately on coercive power, on the sovereign's
ability to inflict violence without juridical impediment.
Second, the creation of an ontology whereby "enemy combatants"
become a definable legal category reduces the moral complexity of our
world (dangerously so, in my view), and most importantly, entirely
obscures our nation's role in it, which arguably may be suitable if one
accepts U.S. global dominance as both the appropriate defining feature of
geopolitics and the justifiable displacement of international law. 72 It is
as if the ontology of "enemy combatants" was foisted upon us by 9/11,
thus eclipsing the very idea that "enemy combatant" is a construct we
have injected into our cultural milieu to pursue our own global
ambitions, as if the lexical menu heretofore in existence (prisoner of war,
criminal, lawful and unlawful combatants, etc.) is somehow inadequate
to accommodate that pursuit. One might understand this to be an
illustration of what is meant when claiming that knowledge is
perspectival, as arising from "human being[s] violently tak[ing] hold of a
certain number of things, react[ing] to a' 73certain number of situations, and
subject[ing] them to relations of force."'
Third, and this is the upshot of repressing moral complexity and
reshaping our lexical menu, notice how easy it is to glide over this
sentence. Deciding upon the "legality of the Government's detention of
a United States citizen"' 174 is hardly a remarkable judicial task; courts,
including the Supreme Court, do that all the time. It is in the nature of
habeas litigation for a court to decide that "legality" question. Because
the "legality" of detention in a "difficult time" triggers thoughts of
171.

See generally MARGULIES, supra note 26.

172. Whatever the attitude of Americans, the rest of the world largely resists the
American quest for global dominance, many seeing the United States-not Islamic
fundamentalists-as the greatest threat to world peace. See BARBER, supra note 6, at 15

("the beacon of democracy the world once most admired has abruptly become the maker
of war the world most fears"); see also id. at 56 (noting Time Magazine poll of
Europeans indicating that seven to eight percent believe Iraq and North Korea pose the
greatest threat to peace; eighty percent believe the United States does). See generally
HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 179-85.
173. Michel Foucault, Truth and Juridical Forms, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER:
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 1954-1984 14 (James D. Faubion ed., Robert Hurley et

al. trans, The New Press 2000) (1994). New "knowledge" possibilities arise in
understanding violence and resistance by the widening of the lexical menu noted in the
text. That is a form of knowledge-production that Foucault has in mind when he talks of
knowledge being born of power relations. Id. at 15 (describing the project as "the
problem of the formation of a certain number of domains of knowledge on the basis of
the relations of force and the political relations in society").
174.

SeeHamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
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Korematsu v. United States,175 it should be said, given the claims in this
article, that the dilemma there-how willing should we be to accept the
sovereign's announcement of an "emergency" as a justification for
bypassing or suspending bedrock due-process norms-may not really be
the dilemma that Hamdi genuinely presents. The necessity at the heart of
Korematsu arose from a global conflagration initiated by nations that had
overt and obviously odious imperial designs. 76 The dilemma in Hamdi
may not be as simple as how willing we are to justify executive power in
times of emergency; at stake may be our blindness, or inadequate
resistance, to the growth of executive power-the growth of
sovereignty-through an "emergency" that is linked to, if not produced
by, the pre-existing global ambitions of the sovereign who is announcing
the emergency. Being open to understanding the cultural significance of
Hamdi in terms of how and why the "emergency" exists-to look at how
the "difficult time" arose-takes a willingness to confront difficult
questions about the identity of our nation.
That is why the most salient thing about how O'Connor frames the
issue is the shifting locution from our "Nation" to "the Government's
detention." To avoid talking about who we are as a nation, we have to
change the subject. And so, within the first paragraph, from the "display
of tellability" to the framing of the legal question to be decided, the
language shifts from this "difficult time" that afflicts our "Nation" to the
more prosaic, more rhetorically modest and antiseptic locution of
governmentality-'"the Government's detention" is being questioned
here, rather than, say, the Nation's resolve to incapacitate "enemy
combatants" who have, for some undisclosed reason, decided to launch
murderous assaults upon the world's oldest democracy. 177 This shift in
locution-setting the rhetorical mood and analytical backdrop with the
idea of nationhood and then formulating the issue with the familiar
terminology of government action-is key to a prevailing imagery one
finds in Hamdi: the image of law in control, of the sovereign acting
always under law, not bypassing it or suspending it. Framing the issue in
terms of the Nation acting to defend itself through the detention of its
enemies-a framing hospitable to the Executive's position in Hamdiforcibly shunts the law aside. Framing the issue that way would drive
the narrative to adopt an image of the law receding as the sovereign
struggles for the survival of the Nation. The imagery of law in control,
of sovereignty acting under law, of law being in the center of this drama,
would in that instance be impossible to sustain. And for the narrative
175.
176.
177.

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944).
Seeid. at 218-19.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.

2007]

AFTER THE GOLD RUSH-PART I

ambitions that undergird this opinion, we shall see, that imagery must be
sustained. So, shifting the locution from nationhood to governmentality
is particularly vital to the opinion.
What is happening here is what always happens in judicial decisionmaking. The framing of the issue, constructing what it is a court is
"called upon" to decide, is itself the fruition of an invisible process of
evaluating, interpreting, and choosing among an array of values and
preferences. 78 That is why it would be a mistake to conclude that
O'Connor's shift in locution suggests that the idea of nationhood, rather
than mere governmentality, is banished from the narrative arc of the
opinion. The opposite remains true. Nationhood is crucial to the entire
rhetorical architecture of the opinion. Counterterrorism-and make no
mistake, the Supreme Court's activity here is explicitly part of the
nation's counterterrorism effort-cannot occur without strong feelings of
moral community that get expressed through nationalism. Yearnings for
a moral community, and fears of it unraveling or of it being assailed,
create a psychological amenability to violence and cruelty, largely
because, under the right conditions where the moral community is
perceived to be in danger, our consciousness strips reality of any genuine
complexity in favor of the simple ontology of good versus evil. When
nihilistic Islamic jihadists threaten our moral community, valued for its
openness and pluralism, we quickly exclude them as fundamental
enemies of our moral community precisely because they are understood
by us to renounce that commitment to openness and pluralism. That core
outlook, unrelentingly pumped up by government officials and media
talking heads, fuels a nationalism that makes indefinite detention of
"enemy combatants" quite easy to justify.
The point here is that it is not the justification of indefinite detention
that is the challenge for the Court. That is the easy part. The challenge
is the preservation of the image of our commitment to the rule of law, in
the face of the already existing desire to indefinitely detain dangerous
jihadists. The challenge is refuting in advance a criticism like that of
Judith Butler's: "'Indefinite detention' is an illegitimate exercise of
power, but it is, significantly, part of a broader tactic to neutralize the
rule of law in the name of security."' 179 So, highlighting the shift in
178. See SHKLAR, supra note 48, at 61 ("A situation calling for a decision is already
the mental construction of the observer, rather than something that presents itself to him
'there' and ready-made.") (citation omitted).
179. BUTLER, supra note 44, at 67. Interestingly, two years after Hamdi, Justice
Stevens closes out his Hamdan opinion with a curious statement that arguably implies
enemy-combatant detention falls outside the "Rule of Law":
It bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we do not today
address, the Government's power to detain him for the duration of active
hostilities in order to prevent ...[terrorist] harm. But in undertaking to try
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locution from nationhood to governmentality is simply a way of positing
that the legal analysis is best framed in terms of governmentality under
judicial scrutiny, given this challenge and the narrative ambitions of the
opinion itself. And chief among those narrative ambitions is the fusing
together of governmentality and nationhood without disrupting the
imagery of the sovereign committed to acting under law. That is no
small feat, in view of the inescapable fact that the current Administration
has openly dedicated itself to destroying the very idea that the United
States operates, 80
or even should operate, within a framework of
international law.
Being "called upon" to decide the "legality" of this particular
detention, rather than simply deciding the constitutional validity of a
particular inmate's incarceration, reinforces the rhetorical mood
established by the Court's opening observation. Legality is indeed the
question here, we are inclined to say, because what makes this a
"difficult time" for our Nation is the belief that Legality itself is under
assault by "terrorists"-Legality being the treasured offspring of
modernity, the supposed core feature of the Western political tradition.18 '
The notion of sovereignty as the power to announce a state of
exception and the implication that Legality as an ideal is a character in a
narrative drama interrelate throughout the opinion's analysis, though the
terminology of O'Connor's analysis hews closely to the linguistic
conventions of the legal culture.' 82 What the narrative here suggests is
that the "difficult time" that O'Connor identifies is, from the Executive's
vantage point, an exceptional time, a state of exception where normal

Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to
comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
180. See, e.g., NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 6, at 6 ("we will not
hesitate to act alone ... to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively
against... terrorists"). See HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 182 ("The words and actions of
this President do not admit any other conclusion than that he wants to replace the
civilizing force of universalistic legal procedures with the particular American ethos
armed with a claim to universality."). Guantanamo exemplifies Habermas's observation.
See also SCHELL, supra note 6, at 6 (characterizing the National Security Strategy as "an
assertion of absolute, enduring American military supremacy over all other countries in
the world").
181. See SHKLAR, supra note 48, at 21. Shklar regards this view of the rule of law as
the core feature of the Western tradition to be a "self-congratulatory view ... that...
flies in the face of the most obvious facts of history." Id. at 22.
182. I will borrow Carl Schmitt's formulation of sovereignty: sovereignty is the
power to decide that a "state of exception" exists; the "sovereign" is "he who decides on
the state of exception." AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 1 (quoting Schmitt). See generally
CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE
MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948); C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE
SURVIVAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1957).
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Legality must be bracketed to create space for sovereign prerogative so
as to preserve Legality. The overt message is that a state of exception is
a condition of necessity, a suspension of a juridical order to preserve it.
What I will be suggesting here is that more than a condition, the creation
of a state of exception is a practice, a technique of the sovereign-a
tactic, to use Foucault's phraseology of law in the hands of the
government183-which produces the suspension of the normal juridical
order by a manufactured necessity that is tied to the sovereign's own
global ambitions. t 84 And those global ambitions-the true producer of
law in this context, and one potent manifestation of the dark side of the
Enlightenment-must be rendered invisible through the "useful
myths"
85
of our nationhood, the very thing we regard as under attack.
B.

The Enterpriseof Classifying and Our Awareness of Our
Interpretive Commitments

Let us return to the observation that the Court never questions the
idea that protecting the homeland is at the heart of the necessity that
drives the legal controversy here, that the backdrop to the legal
controversy is an existential crisis. And as for that legal controversy, it
concerns not the evidentiary quality that undergirds the detention
decision; nor does it concern itself with conduct per se. While the
analytical juridical focus is on governmentality-assessing the allocation
of authority between the other two branches of government-the

183. See FOUCAULT, Governmentality, supra note 39, at 211 ("[W]ith government it is
a question not of imposing law on men but of disposing things: that is, of employing
tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics-to arrange things
in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-and-such ends may be
achieved.").
184. I appreciate that the phrase, "global ambitions," is ideologically charged. I have
my own point of view about the worthiness and wisdom of America's global ambitions,
but I do not intend to use this article as a platform to defend that point of view. I want to
use the phrase, just as I use the term empire, as an observable fact, leaving the judgment
about the wisdom of America's global ambitions for others to debate in other forums. I
do not mean to say, in using the phrase "manufactured necessity," that we in the United
States are not threatened with physical harm by Islamic fundamentalists who have vowed
to kill Americans. We undoubtedly find ourselves, as a nation, needing to protect
ourselves against domestic attack. We had a similar need to protect ourselves against the
threat of nuclear annihilation. What is "manufactured" in both instances are the
circumstances that create the threat, or at least produce the conditions that induce or
encourage the threat.
185. BARBER, supra note 6, at 19 (noting that the "useful myths... by which the last
century's costly hot and cold wars were bravely fought and decisively won-American
autonomy, American virtue, American democracy, and American innocence-are
reasserted with patriotic ardor at home, even as they are deemed hollow and hypocritical
abroad").
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86
underlying core controversy, as the Court frames it, concerns status.1
Within this framing of the issue we are introduced to the term, "enemy
combatant."' 87 Under what conditions, procedural or otherwise, is it
"legal" to detain someone based upon that "classification," a
classification undoubtedly connected to this "difficult time" that we
face? Here, though the word is unmentioned, we get our first glimmer
that this "difficult time" is connected to the notion that we are at "war"whatever that means. From a narrow analytical point of view, "war" will
be used later in the opinion as that element of the legal analysis that sets
the temporal boundary of the detention.' 88 Being deemed an enemy
combatant
makes you eligible for preventive detention so long as we are
89

"at war.'

But that analytical function masks how "war" fuels the narrative.
For in a war, all we care about is the grand and blunt categorization:
whose side are you on? That was the talk after 9/11, the cartoon-like
obsession: whose side are you on? You are either with us or you are
with the terrorists. And so, the "difficult time" that provides a "display
of tellability" for this case, that impels us to "call upon" the Court to take
center stage, is a time when we must classify with utmost urgency, when
we must know whose side you are on.'90
The task of classifying is quintessentially legalistic. The lawschool-classroom experience is dominated, in essence, with the question,
is this particularthing or event or person properly classified as X, or
should it be understood as something else, some not-X? Certain
consequences follow from the answer; state power expands or contracts,
depending on how something or someone is "classified." From this
vantage point, the task of categorizing Mr. Hamdi as an enemy
combatant is hardly remarkable-the process by which we carry out that
task may be up for grabs, as it is in Hamdi, but the abstract operational
directive to perform it is not, for legal directives abound to mandate that
legal actors categorize.
This mandate to categorize expresses itself in the lawyer's mind
through a blinding penchant to think abstractly. 9' Abstract thinking in
the service of categorizing is a distinctive feature of the scientific method
as it has developed in the Enlightenment era. Whatever its merits and
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
the sort

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
Id.
See id. at 519-24 (2004).
Id. at 518.
This sort of negative identity-defining something by what it is not-is precisely
of tribalism and group-think that the Enlightenment project seeks to overcome.

See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 313.

191. Judith Shklar puts it more pejoratively, stating that legal thought is rife with
"playing with words" and "bickering over definitions." SHKLAR, supra note 48, at 24.
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demerits in the realm of science, this penchant for abstract thinking is
particularly hazardous in law, precisely because law as an activity is a
thoroughly human endeavor where the threat and infliction of violence
pervades the enterprise (given how law is too often taught, a law student
might be excused for missing out on that elementary fact). 192 The
concrete and the particular routinely get eclipsed by the general. Law
operates through the medium of abstractions, articulated through
reductive language, through a this-is-not-that logic, and through the
finagling of inherent tensions between specific words and visions of what
those words are there to accomplish.
Through the medium of
abstractions, concepts and categories are constricted to make room for
new concepts and categories, with the upshot being that power is
enlarged or diminished, and private violence is tamed or state violence is
threatened or actually inflicted. 193 The hazard resides in the fact that the
medium in which law operates-abstractions and reductive languagefalsifies life, only to then serve as a medium for allocating power to
produce a social ontology that we confront and act upon as real. That
hazard gets concealed because of the way we treat the introduction of a
new category in our juridical practices. When we introduce categories
into the law, we treat them as if they enter into a field of activity to fill in
a vacant slot, as if they function to fill a void that the circumstances of
life unexpectedly create. That is the image we have, roughly speaking,
when we say that necessity produces law.
To jump directly into the topic at hand, the concrete and particular
human being that is discussed in the Hamdi opinion, Yaser Hamdi, is
eclipsed by the abstraction we have accepted within our mental
framework for dealing with Islamic fundamentalists-the abstraction
being "terrorists." The cages at Guantanamo Bay are filled with these
abstractions, stick figures in orange jumpsuits who are, in our eyes, no
longer complex human beings with a particular history and
consciousness that are worthy of our serious attention, but instead are
human missiles of destruction who must be detained to protect the rest of
194
us.
The abstract label of "terrorist" within an uncertain geopolitical
milieu we have come to call the "war on terror" removes Hamdi from the
category of an accused person, and thus eliminates him from a regime of
law (i.e., the criminal justice system), and thereby generates a void in the
juridical landscape. Hamdi can never be outside "law." The "difficult
192. See Cover, Violence, supra note 124, at 1610 ("Legal interpretation is...
designed to generate credible threats and actual deeds of violence .....
193. See id.
194. To appreciate the power of the concrete and the particular, see MOAZZAM BEGG,
ENEMY COMBATANT: MY IMPRISONMENT AT GUANTANAMO, BAGRAM, AND KANDAHAR

(2006) (for a personal account of being imprisoned at Guantanamo).
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time" speaks to a necessity that gestures at that vacant slot in the law,
and the juridical category "enemy combatant" must be conjured up to fill
it.
The narrative function of this "difficult time" is therefore lexical
code for a state of exception, which in turn generates the category of
"enemy combatant" to fill the necessity-producing vacant slot in our law.
That the essential point of generating a new juridical category, a new
ontology involving "enemy combatants," is to create space for expanded
sovereign power; indeed, that the ultimate effect, if not purpose, of
having that term remain ambiguous, fluid, indefinable, is to create
opportunities for expanded sovereign power-all this sinks beneath the
surface, invisible to most Americans. These geo-political terms-enemy
combatant and terrorist-areinvoked and infused with dark meaning to
revivify the sovereign power to kill (and hence, to grant life), for the
bedrock function of these labels is to signal that that particular human
being so labeled must be vanquished. Vanquishing is what the war on
terror is about, in much the way that a society would mobilize its
resources and organize the application of sovereign power to vanquish a
plague. Vanquishing calls for administrative effectiveness, not dialogue.
What Hamdi offers in this "difficult time" is a veil of administrative
decency to that effort.
That veil of administrative decency is precisely what we are
directed to see. When we look at the veil and not what swirls behind it,
we see our noble aspirations yoking ourselves to the "rule of law." There
is, in other words, no bypassing the Constitution, no suspending legality
by ignoring the criminal-justice process; indeed, we can applaud the
Court for resisting the Bush Administration's effort to "fuse [the function
of the three branches] under one man's ultimate rule" and so avert the
"mock[ing of] the very notion of constitutionalism., 195 There is, to put it
grandly, no betrayal of any promise of democracy or the rule of law;
there is only the filling of a juridical void that necessity demands to be
filled, since what else is the rule of law if not the seamless fabric of law
that covers all aspects of life, all "bare life," like a cozy warm blanket.
Of course, the warm blanket of the rule of law has a soporific tendency,
lulling us from an awareness that most mass killings and human
suffering has occurred pursuant to the rule of law rather than in defiance
of it: Nazi Germany operated under the rule of law, as did South Africa's
apartheid regime; the slaughter of Native Americans and the enslavement
of Africans in this country; the dropping of Atomic bombs on two
Japanese cities and the devastating carpet bombings on ancient peasant
villages in Vietnam; the training of death squad officers and the bloody
195.

Katyal & Tribe, supra note 38, at 1259.
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subversion of liberation movements throughout the poorest regions of the96
world-all of it conducted under the warm blanket of the rule of law.
The "war on terror," including the detentions at Guantanamo, is hardly
lawless; it is replete with laws, with legalisms, with a jurisprudence of its
own. As noted earlier, it operates on the most fearsome sort of legality, a
form of law that permits the bracketing of other laws-and not just
prosaic rules and regulations, but the most fundamental legal strictures
binding us and our society.
Needless to say, the remarks above are not meant to suggest that the
rule of law is farcical or otherwise a bad thing; it simply points to a
larger truth, that grandiose ideas, no matter how humane-sounding they
may be, are ill-suited to protecting against disastrous choices and
policies. And this observation is important in order to get us beyond the
operational level, for the rhetorical strategies of the Hamdi opinionstrategies that weld together our aspiration to live by the rule of law with
our analytical devotion to figuring out how best to effectuate the
constitutional demand that we be a country of separated powers-has the
effect of keeping us from engaging our consciousness about the nature of
our interpretive commitments. This is not to say that Hamdi exemplifies
something unusual or even unique in legal analysis. Quite the contrary:
it exemplifies what is typical in legal reasoning, which is the
concealment of the connection between personal commitment and legal
judgments. "The normative universe is held together by the force of
interpretive commitments," Robert Cover argues, and "[t]hese
commitments... do determine what law means and what law shall
be."' 197 The world of possible victims of violence (us) at the hands of
"enemy combatants" (read, "terrorists" (them)) is not a world thrust upon
us, as if we were a nation occupying our own vast space on the globe
minding our business, a huge inexplicable target for vicious assaults by
evildoers. Politicians and too many television "experts" treat the war on
terror as if this were so. But this world where we have become a target
of jihadists is one constructed in part from our particular commitments
within a world that exists among many possible worlds. Hamdi's
operational discourse about what process is due a particular individual
who is struggling against a particularly dire classification sits atop a heap
of commitments to a particular embodiment of how we think the world
196.

Cf Judith Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in

THE RULE OF LAW:

IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1-16 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) (arguing

that "rule of law" does not ensure commitment to other moral values or to a regime of
rights); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF

LAW 211 (1979) ("[T]he rule of law is just one of the virtues which a legal system may
possess and by which it is to be judged.").
197. Cover, Forward,supra note 1, at 7.
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ought to be. Those commitments are there not to be defended-that is
one lesson of Hamdi, though not a lesson that many people will draw
from it-but they are there to give the operational discourse about what
process is due a muted resonance of inevitability and naturalness. They
are there to propagate the image that balancing security and liberty
consists of putting things on a scale and observing the tilt, whereas the
reality is that the entire enterprise of thinking about security and liberty
rests upon what we are committing ourselves to as a nation in a world of
globalization that transforms people and cultures into competitors, where
their struggles are tallied in ledger books as economic winners and
losers.
When Cover speaks of interpretive commitments holding the
normative universe together, 198 I take him to mean, among other things,
that meanings arise not from our relationship to an external world, as if
we actually inhabited a Cartesian universe, but rather they bespeak a
relationship between people, between communicative beings. "Legal
precepts and principles are not only demands made upon us by society,
the people, the sovereign, or God[,]" Cover says. 199 "They are also signs
by which each of us communicates with others., 200 This suggests that
juridical discourse must ask, what sorts of interpretive commitments,
visions of social life-and in this globalization age, what sort of global
order-are necessary to validate a particular normative construction of
observed legal facts? We can treat the category of "enemy combatant"
as a statutory construct that classifies certain individuals according to
genuine external events embedded within a particular national policy we
have termed the "war on terror." But we do so at the price of our
humanity, if we take seriously Cover's notion of interpretive
commitments, because that antiseptic and legalistic treatment of the term,
which characterizes the Court's narrative in Hamdi, denies us the ability
to see what it does to ourselves, we Americans who are, in actuality, far
removed from the so-called battlefields of the war on terror.
How it degrades us, in all its manifold ways, is too recondite a
subject for this article. But perhaps we might agree that the category of
"enemy combatant" which is at the heart of the endeavor to protect
Legality is much more than a status that has enormous legal
consequences; it, along with Guantanamo as a site for detention of
enemy combatants, is important as a symbol, a vessel of meaning, that
infiltrates our social and juridical practices-as all resonating symbols do
in a political culture. Symbols within a political culture get expressed

198.

Id.

199.

Id. at 8.

200.

Id.
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through social and juridical practices and thereby become vessels of
meaning; in this instance, the symbolic quality of "enemy combatant,"
arising from our efforts to cope with our 9/11 anxieties, may over time
express itself through a consciousness that treats the world and our
relations in terms of "dangerousness" and "security" severed from the
oncoming reality that the barometer of our fulfillment is not what civil
liberties we might manage to salvage, but our ability to continue a form
of consumerism dedicated to distracting ourselves from distractions with
ever more distractions. To treat the creation of a category like "enemy
combatant" as merely a slot-filling exercise, as a mere response to a void
produced by "necessity," is to falsify life, for life does not actually
consist of slots and voids, whereby things are invented or created to fill
those slots and voids for the betterment of our experience in living life.
Life is actually experienced more like a full fabric, a full tapestry of
relationships and practices. And so, when a new category is thrust into
that life-just as when a new technology enters into life-the fabric is
torn and needs to be rewoven, which then changes our experiences in life
in ways far deeper than we are inclined to believe.2 °1
VI. The Conduct-Status Distinction and the "Everything Changed"
Mantra of 9/11
For status, and not conduct, to be the underlying controversy (and
that has to be so in order not to disrupt the overarching regime of
Legality as we understand it, where conduct and blameworthiness is
handled through the criminal justice process), the Court must cast the
narrative in a way that eliminates from Mr. Hamdi himself the role of a
human agent. Mr. Hamdi the person must become incidental to the
story, a flat character rather than a round character, more like a prop than
a genuine participant in the narrative arc. We can see this being
accomplished by how the Court begins Part I of the opinion.20 2 The
opening paragraph of Part I of the opinion establishes that this case is a
story told not from the point of view of a person detained without any
ability to fight back against the detention, a person thrown into a
jurisprudential black hole.20 3 It is a story told from the point of view of a
wounded nation, a victimized nation,
a nation victimized by the
20 4
"treacher[y]" of "terrorist attacks":
On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network used hijacked
commercial airliners to attack prominent targets in the United States.
201.
202.

See ALBERT BORGMANN, CROSSING THE POSTMODERN DIVIDE 111-13 (1992).
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).

203.
204.

See id.
Id.
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Approximately 3,000 people were killed in those attacks. One week
later, in response to these "acts of treacherous violence," Congress
passed a resolution authorizing the President to "use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks" or "harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of• international
terrorism against the United
•
•,,205
States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Governmentality may be what is being considered in this case (most
obviously, what did Congress say the President could do), but
governmentality is not what this story is about. We now get within the
opinion our first concrete picture of the "difficult time" that we now face
as a Nation, one that hardly surprises, and that-the lack of surprise-is
one intriguing hidden feature of the case. It would take a near Herculean
effort, a sustained conscientious commitment to detach oneself from the
incessant chatter of our post-9/11 world about the so-called "war on
terror," to think that this "difficult time" might mean something different
than the picture we get from this opening paragraph to Part I of the
opinion. The Hamdi narrative begins here, with 9/11. Detachment from
our 9/11 anxieties might allow us to see that beginning the narrative with
9/11 is a choice-good or not is beside the point for the moment-for
there is no a priori beginning or ineluctable and definitive ending.
Beginnings and endings are narrative constructions, and as such are
worthy of interrogating. The first thing to interrogate is the observation
that there is, in Hamdi, no backstory to 9/11, and no attempt to provide
one; indeed, no suggestion that one even exists. 9/11 is, in the deepest
sense (meaning, beyond any realm of choosing), the beginning of this
narrative. And that jars the reader not at all, for how insistent has the
drumbeat been, that with the fall of the Twin Towers, "everything
changed"?
The Holocaust produced a question: How could this happen? 9/11
produced a mantra: "Everything changed." It is the mantra of our time.
Why that mantra resonates is a tantalizing question, and it will
entangle for decades courageous minds that can ward off the blustery
noise of our chattering cultural organs. One might say, with Bruce
Ackerman, that this mantra bespeaks the notion that the "risks [Al
Qaeda] poses are grave but historically unique. 2 °6 But that is not quite
precise enough. There is nothing unique in a stateless and loosely
confederated group of true believers attacking a powerful state through
violence that is calculated to instill fear in the people, and thus erode the
205.
206.

Id.
ACKERMAN, supra note

15, at 4.
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sovereign's credibility. Surely one reason why, to us, 9/11 seems sui
generis, why the choice to opt for no backstory does not at all feel odd or
underhanded or anything other than perfectly natural and appropriate, is
that on that day our optimism about our technological prowess, which is
the birthright of our Enlightenment heritage and the very lifeblood of our
perceived entitlement to global economic dominance, fell into the rubble
of the Twin Towers.2 °7 9/11 is a day when a few men with box cutters
used our technology against us, slamming into symbols of American
global and military power, a magnificent aesthetic achievement for the
jihadists and those who supported and celebrated the attacks.
"Everything changed" on 9/11 in a way that is cataclysmically different
than the way "everything changed" on two days in August 1945, when
we obliterated two cities with atomic bombs, a weapon that stood for one
of Enlightenment rationality's greatest achievements. The change we as
a nation experienced in the late summer of 1945 differs from how we
experience the "change" wrought by 9/11 because, at least in part, in
1945 it was our technological prowess being used for our own military
ends; it was our Enlightenment triumph. The nuclear obliteration of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki-worthy or not from a geopolitical standpoint
is beside the point here-affirmed our optimism in technology, and thus
fogs up the mirror, blurring how that act constitutes both a scientific
triumph and "an irreversible loss of something that mankind cannot
afford to lose. 208 The slamming of airliners into the Twin Towers and
the Pentagon shattered that optimism. And with that loss of optimism is
the sobering reality that now we live in a world where the power of
nuclear obliteration may rapidly become democratized.
So, what has changed is not the onset of an age of terrorism. What
has changed is the current and future effectiveness of terrorism by nonstate actors, a particular effectiveness to destabilize the ongoing activities
of powerful nation-states, all of which is a product of a new high-tech
free market.
But the "everything changed" mantra hits upon something even
deeper. 9/11, as an event where our own technological prowess was
whipsawed back upon us, did not only rock our confidence in that
technological prowess; it awakened us to an uncomfortable

207. Much of American optimism is rooted in our technological prowess. See
BARBER, supra note 6, at 66 ("The idea of an American technology rooted in American
know-how that protects good from evil, innocence from corruption, Eden from the
seething lands east of Eden, appeals deeply to America's exceptionalist core."). Popular
television shows like 24 recapture that optimism, which probably partly explains their
cultural resonance.
208.

ERWIN CHARGAFF, HERACLITEAN FIRE: SKETCHES FROM A LIFE BEFORE NATURE

104 (1978).
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consciousness. That uncomfortable consciousness understands that
terrorist attacks not only threaten lives-even though the statistical
chances of being killed or injured in one is rather slim-they threaten to
slow us down, literally, by knocking out the electronic and digital
infrastructure of a high-tech machine that is no longer just a convenience
in our daily lives, but now is essential to it. Essential, because that
machine is now in our heads, a part of a reality that
we experience as
' 20 9
normal, a reality Umberto Eco calls, "hyperreality.
In a hyperreal world, life becomes game-like, where we no longer
experience disappointments and redemption, but instead experience the
ups and downs of living as winning and losing. 210 This experiencing of
life in terms of winning and losing meshes conveniently with the
simplistic discourse of security-versus-liberty. The medium through
which criminal-justice analysis operates is that discourse. But that way
of talking masks the deeper tensions and anxieties that drive our Western
culture. And the masking of those deeper tensions and anxieties is one
crucial reason why, as Jacques Derrida observed, we cannot really name
what happened on September 11, 2001.211 "9/11" is a name we put on
what is really an unnameable event. It is an event that can only carry a
date as its identifier because it cannot, as of yet, be in our collective
consciousness merely a terrible episode on a particular day. It is an
unnameable event because we cannot mark moments of profound
changes in awareness with a descriptive category, especially when what
we have is a moment of unleashing, the unleashing of dread, of an
awareness of deep and irredeemable vulnerability, the unleashing of the
other drive within our Enlightenment heritage, the drive to control and
dominate the forces that threaten us, the drive to maintain our security
and stamp out our vulnerability. 212 9/11 is the world's marker of an
209. See UMBERTO Eco, TRAVELS IN HYPERREALITY 3-58 (1986). Our means-ends
rationality, with all its spectacular success, with all the magnificent prosthetics that has
moved Man closer to being Godlike (to use Freud's evocative imagery), has rapidly
thrust us into a world of "hyperreality." See FREUD, supra note 75, at 39.
210. This is how philosopher Albert Borgmann describes this phenomenon:
While reality is boundless in its difficulties, a game is always bounded by its
board, its cards, or its playing surface and rules, thus secured against
unforeseen aggravation. At the same time, a good game presents limitless
possibilities and challenges within these protective boundaries. While the real
world holds misery and grace, the hyperreal universe contains only news,
challenges that demand one's reaction. And while in reality one may be
defeated or redeemed, in hyperreality one can only win or lose. In the real
world one may earn affection and gratitude; in the hyperreal framework there
are only prizes and acclaim.
BORGMANN, supra note 201, at 99.
211. See generally GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR:
DIALOGUES WITH JORGEN HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA (2003).
212. See HELD, supra note 77.
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unnameable event, one well-known international relations expert
suggests, because "a large part of the empire-building enterprise [is]
designed to control the future rather than to colonize specific units in
space. 2 13
Under these circumstances, O'Connor's decision to construct her
narrative as she did, with 9/11 as its beginning, must necessarily seem
inevitable.2 14 Putting 9/11 in the broader frame of the Cold War and the
repercussions of its aftermath,215 and the Cold War in the broader frame
of colonialism and global empire-building, and aspirations for empire in
the broader frame of racism and the inexorable, blood-soaked Western
drive to dominate, and that quest for hegemony in the broader frame of
preserving unwarranted, if not obscene, economic privilege, and that
economic privilege in the yet broader frame of our cultural and mass
psychological assumption that wealth and progress are our reward for
fully implementing an Enlightenment project that valorizes individual
liberty and rescued humanity through rationality from the darkness of
superstition, irrational religiosity, and unquestioned tradition-only
through these broader frames can we create the possibility of
experiencing 9/11 as a different sort of event, as not a beginning but a
fruition. We leave open the possibility that 9/11 is a disturbing
culmination of a particular cultural trajectory-a trajectory launched by
forces within the Enlightenment itself.216 So thick is the swirl of rhetoric
about 9/11 as instantiating something new, something sui generis,
213. Falk, supra note 76, at 47.
214. True, we have the 9/11 Commission's report, which speaks of the events that led
up to the 9/11 attacks. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), available at http://www.91 commission.gov/report/9 11 Report.pdf. But those events only give texture to the key
event here, the true beginning of any narrative that concerns our so-called war on terror.
215. Particularly relevant here is the United States' engineering of the coup that
installed the Shah of Iran, thus sabotaging Iranian democracy, and leading to torture and
killing by the Iranian secret police (largely trained by the CIA and the Israeli Mossad) at
a level that Amnesty International could only say was "beyond belief." STEPHEN KINZER,
ALL THE SHAH'S MEN: AN AMERICA COUP AND THE ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR 20315 (2003); BERMAN, supra note 4, at 168. The Shah's brutal regime led directly to the
rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the 1979 hostage crisis, the funding of Islamic
terrorism, our support for Saddam Hussein, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in
Afghanistan (which looked to the Iranian revolution for inspiration); the emergence of
that fundamentalism precipitated the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. backing
of the Islamists, which then produced the current blowback from that backing, in the form
of Al Qaeda. See KINZER, supra at 196-98.
216. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at 4 (9/11 "did not create or fundamentally
change [the] global situation" wherein armed conflicts (large and small) are all "part of a
grand constellation" with combatants "struggling.. . for relative dominance within the
hierarchies at the highest and lowest levels of the global system."). In our globalized
geopolitical environment, armed conflicts are a form of "global civil war." Id. 9/11
simply awakened us to this fact; it did not bring it about.
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something that is decidedly not part of some larger narrative, seeing 9/11
from within the United States as a fruition of some trajectory within the
currents of our own culture can only seem insane, if not traitorous.2 17
That is, I suspect that a consciousness that fully confronts 9/11 as an
event within a larger narrative outside the mythos of American
exceptionalism is for most Americans an entirely alien consciousness.
And that may be just a polite way of saying that it is a consciousness
many Americans would be tempted to regard as "insane. 2 18
But if we can somehow summon the mindset-imagination, if you
will-to regard 9/11 as a fruition and not a beginning, then we might
experience the reading of Hamdi differently. It, too, becomes not a case
about an extraordinary response to an extraordinary situation, but a case
about a fruition-a fruition in a line of cases where the status of
dangerousness is the linchpin to detention, rather than moral
blameworthiness, arrived at through a communicative process that
valorizes the Kantian side (the bright side, in contradistinction to the dark
side) of our Enlightenment heritage, where each individual has a human
dignity that commands rational communication be accorded him. On
this view, what 9/11 has done is unleash an impulse that has been
working its way through legal doctrine for quite some time, 219*just as it
has unleashed, I submit, the dark Wilsonian impulse to remake the world
in a way that directly benefits a small slice of the world's population,
with the hoped-for ancillary benefit that maybe the number of have-nots
in the world will shrink as well.
Alas, with 9/11 as the beginning of the narrative, the issue in Hamdi
is confined to a supposed state of exception, and the meaning of the
present within our nation's consciousness can only consist of the fact that
we are in the midst of defending ourselves against future victimization
arising from this phenomenon we have come to call "international
terrorism." Maybe there will come a time when, as Wendell Berry puts
it, "we will not be able to remember the horrors of September 11 without
remembering also the unquestioning technological and economic

217. See BUTLER, supra note 44, at 8.
218. Matters are quite different once we get out from the straitjacket of American
exceptionalism. Philosopher Jacques Derrida, for instance, can express the unsayable:
"My absolute compassion for the victims of September 11 does not stop me from saying
it: I do not believe in the political innocence of anyone in this crime." HARDT & NEGRI,
supra note 7, at 361 n. 19.
219. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.2d 564, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(tracing in detail the line of cases authorizing confinement without a criminal
adjudication). Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the AUMF should be interpreted to
authorize detention of enemy combatants based on a dangerousness test, which departs
from the conventional rationale of detaining combatants captured during wartime.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2125.

2007]

AFTER THE GOLD RUSH-PART

optimism that ended on that day.,

I

220

And perhaps the shattering of that optimism-a uniquely North
American optimism which contains within it the deadly blindness that
this prosperity has long been limited to a tiny percentage of the world's
people-is the psychological substratum of O'Connor's reference to
"this difficult time." Our technological prowess, a supposed blessed fruit
of our prosperity, was, at the level of myth and at the level of our
philosophical heritage, supposed to make us free, not entrap us. But at a
deeper psychological level, that technological prowess promised
dominance over nature and betterment in our mutual relations, a
betterment that too often translated into a dominance over other peoples
for economic advantage, which, in turn, is naturalized in our own
consciousness as harmonizing with the natural order of things.
Indeed, that technological prowess gave us not only an optimism
that all challenges and problems could be overcome, but gave us an
image of ourselves that suggested, despite our surface religiosity, "[m]an
has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God.",2 1 The future can only
produce even more "auxiliary organs" that drive humanity-or, at least,
the selected beneficiaries of technology-ever closer to the "likeness [of]
God., 222 Associated with this is the fact that we have constructed what
one sociologist calls the "Automoton" that exists at "the core of our
economies, decisively conditioning our lives":
Humankind's nightmare of seeing our machines taking control of our
world seems on the edge of becoming a reality-not in the form of
robots.., but as an electronically based system of financial
transactions. The system overwhelms controls and regulations put in
place by governments, international institutions and private financial
firms.... Its logic is not controlled by any individual ca italist or
corporation-nor, for that matter, by any public institution.
And so, it is not the three thousand dead, nor is it the
hostilities with a low-tech enemy, that gives profundity to 9/11
difficult time," but the vulnerability of the Automoton and
surprise that "all our sequence of innovations might be

220.

onset of
and "this
the utter
at once

WENDELL BERRY, IN THE PRESENCE OF FEAR: THREE ESSAYS FOR A CHANGED

WORLD 1 (2001) [hereinafter BERRY, FEAR].

221. FREUD, supra note 75, at 38-39.
222. Id. at 39. See also PANGLE, supra note 94, at 42-43 (discussing Heidegger's
awakening to his own failure to "appreciate sufficiently the drive to mastery and
domination implicit in Western rationalism"); UNGER, supra note 32, at 162
("Instrumentalism expresses the ideal of the subordination of nature and society to human
will, putting mankind in the place of God.").
223. Manuel Castells, Information Technology and Global Capitalism, in BERMAN,
supra note 4, at 76.
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overridden by a greater one: the invention of a new kind of war that
would turn our previous innovations against us, discovering
and
224
exploiting the debits and the dangers that we had ignored.
This psychological substratum of our 9/11 anxieties remains there,
as substratum.. And this may well explain why "this difficult time" is
regarded as exceptional but largely unspecified. We understand what it
means without great explication; we understand it as if it were part of a
private language. We understand it without elaboration attached to it in
the same way that people in mourning understand each other's sadness
and grief. And, indeed, philosopher Giorgio Agamben, probing the
peculiar semantic roots of the notion of a "state of exception," links it to
public mourning following the death of the sovereign. 225 "Just as...
periods of mourning [are] usually characterized by a suspension and
alteration of all social relations," states of exception involve periods of
"anomie and crisis, [where] normal social structures can collapse and
social functions and roles break down to the point where culturally
conditioned behaviors and customs are completely overturned.... 2 26
What we mourn in the wake of 9/11 is an inexpressible loss that is
entwined with our now shattered faith in our own technological prowess.
Our mourning is nourished by our newfound vulnerability, perhaps not
unlike the vulnerability this nation felt with the assassination of
Presidents Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, or the vulnerability
many feel with the death of a parent. And tucked deep within that
mourning is what H.S. Versnell calls an "anomic terror," a terror that
percolates to the surface "whenever the legitimations that obscure the
precariousness [of our lives and privileges] are threatened or collapse. 2 27
The violence that we have unleashed in the wake of 9/11 could well be
explained in part by our need to repress that anomic terror.228
224. BERRY, FEAR, supra note 220, at 3.
225. AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 65.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 66.
228. Repression is needed here, not because feeling anomic terror is unpleasant. The
relationship between anomic terror and law itself-that is, the way anomic terror
produces Legality, which is the central character in the Hamdi narrative, the thing we
must protect-must be unexpressed. Agamben's historical investigation is particularly
helpful here. In its pre-Enlightenment understanding, the sovereign, usually in the form
of a king, stands as the "living law," which "can only mean that he is not bound by it, that
in him the life of the law coincides with a total anomie." AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 69.
Agamben's point is that the "identification between sovereign and law represents.., the
first attempt to assert the anomie of the sovereign and, at the same time, his essential link
to the juridical order." Id. The death of the king thus risks the death of Legality and the
onset of anomic terror; public mourning serves as a ritual to keep the social order intact
as Legality finds a home in the person of a new sovereign. See id. In its modem form,
the ritual of public mourning and the preservation of Legality gets expressed through the
idea of a "state of exception."
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Anomic terror never gets expressed in official government discourse
regarding 9/11 or the war on terror, and by and large does not get
expressed in mainstream chatter either. No surprise, then, that it is
unexpressed in Hamdi. Instead, the story of this wounded nation
responding to its victimization is presented. in Hamdi in a very American
way. We are not willy-nilly unleashing our power in retaliation-at least
not doing so within the rhetorical universe of our country, for the
"mainstream" discourse has it, as a matter of dogma, that the United
States never does that. Three thousand people dead and Congress passes
a resolution, the AUMF-"law" steps in to respond. For it is only after
law's entry into this drama does our military might come into play.
Notice how the first paragraph of Part I ends, after the reference to the
treachery of the terrorists: "Soon thereafter, the President ordered United
States Armed Forces to Afghanistan, with a mission to subdue al Qaeda
and quell the Taliban regime that was known to support it."22 9 Al Qaeda
attacks and the President responds. Between those bookends of action is
the law's intervention. Legality is indeed a central character in this story,
which one might find disturbingly ironic, if one were to pursue
Habermas's critique (to cite just one of many similar critiques) that the
United States has revealed itself to be, over the past half century, and
most egregiously since 2002, utterly disdainful of the idea of legality
when it comes to global affairs.230
VII. War, Terror, and the Unleashing of the Dark Side of the
Enlightenment
Exactly how Legality is cast in the post-9/1 1 drama turns on what
the juridical outcome shall be. To the district court deciding Hamdi,
Legality is under assault by an Executive that is seeking to detain merely
on its say-so. 23 1 To the Fourth Circuit, reviewing the district court's
decision, Legality is under assault by Al Qaeda and the Executive's
232
power to act is crucial to defend the rule of 2law.
Mr. Hamdi won in
33
the district court but lost in the Fourth Circuit.
A.

The Ontology of Enemy Combatants

Part II of the Hamdi opinion presents the "threshold question" as a
particular variant on Legality---does the Executive have the authority to

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 103.
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511-16.
See id.
See id.
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detain U.S. citizens it deems "enemy combatants"? 234 Deems, not
proves. 235 The lexical controversy over what exactly is an enemy
combatant does not surface with any urgency here because Hamdi was
captured on a battlefield and allegedly carrying a rifle, presumably
prepared to shoot at American soldiers.23 6 In fact, Hamdi's lack of
agency in this narrative construction is precisely the point of the opinion:
it is his "status" that must be at issue, not what he has done, even though
"the power to detain an individual as an 'enemy combatant' turns on
entirely conduct., 237 And so, O'Connor is careful to circumscribe
Hamdi's conduct, pointing out that Hamdi's situation as a Taliban fighter
in the armed conflict in Afghanistan puts a border around the analysis.23 8
The effect is to link the legal terminology, "enemy combatant," to
images of conventional warfare that people of O'Connor's generation
have grown up with. But surely she must know that her opinion would
become, as it has indeed become, a jurisprudential landmark in this new
kind of war, where the enemy is stateless, a network of human missiles
of destruction. And with some diligent investigation, she and the other
members of the Court might even understand how enemy-combatant
detention is actually a form of empire police action, a militarized
management of a global order.239 Whether that understanding would
change the analysis is impossible to know. But what is knowable is the
fact that cabining the case to involve an alleged Taliban soldier caught
fighting us in a conventional war shuts off the possibility of seeing the
true global function of enemy-combatant detentions and thus forecloses a
reckoning with the reality of Guantanamo.
Because the act-status distinction does not receive any sustained
treatment in the Hamdi opinion-it is just there, as if it were some
natural epistemic phenomenon 24 0 -it takes some effort to decode exactly
234. Id.at 516.
235. Judith Butler's critique of this "deeming" process illustrates powerfully her
thesis that the policy of indefinite detention constitutes a resurgence of sovereignty:
This act of "deeming" takes place in the context of a declared state of
emergency in which the state exercises prerogatory power that involves the
suspension of law, including due process for these individuals. The act is
warranted by the one who acts, and the "deeming" of someone as dangerous is
sufficient to make that person dangerous and to justify his indefinite detention.
The one who makes this decision assumes a lawless and yet fully effective
form of power with the consequence not only of depriving an incarcerated
human being of the possibility of a trial. .. but of investing the governmental
bureaucrat with an extraordinary power over life and death.
BUTLER, supra note 44, at 59.
236. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513.
237. Hafetz, supra note 15, at 421.
238. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
239. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at 321-22.
240. The act-status distinction arose to filter out from the criminal process those cases
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what the AUMF is all about, functionally speaking, as it relates to the
legal issue in Hamdi. What Congress supposedly did through the
AUMF, through the process of legality, is to authorize not so much the
detention of so-called "enemy combatants," but to authorize the
suspension of our entire criminal process when it comes to citizens
deemed to be "enemy combatants." We lose the force of what is really
going on when we glide along the antiseptic prose O'Connor deploys
because the case becomes a question about wording-does this piece of
legislation contain the sorts of words that authorize the President to
executively detain certain individuals? The full force of Congress's
purported action can only be appreciated if we remind ourselves of how
that criminal process is linked to our Enlightenment heritage. 241 By
stepping back and seeing that a very basic narrative choice has been
made, that the story is not about Yaser Hamdi's predicament, but the
predicament of Legality itself, we become attuned to the fact that, in this
drama of dignity and minimal respect, we are obligated to ask ourselves,
what has 9/11 done to us, what has it really wrought? What has it
unleashed? For it is possible that in this drama, Legality is a victim of
terrorism, but not in the way that Viet Dinh had in mind.
Try as it might to suppress opening up for consideration issues of
national identity by framing the case in terms of status, the Court's
narrative ramifies beyond just the prosaic, though important, question of
what minimal process (trivial process, actually) detainees like Hamdi are
due. The narrative cannot help but be about the unquestioned power of
the sovereign to create a particular ontology in this war on terror. The
legal issue that is built atop this ontological creation-the category of
"enemy combatant"-is the epistemological question of what legal
process ought we install to justify a claim that a certain individual falls
within this status category (which is, to put it in epistemological terms, a
claim to knowledge).
By framing the case purely in terms of
epistemology (is, or is he not, an enemy combatant?), the Court de facto
concedes to the Executive the power of ontology. And that concession is
no small matter, if it is true that the "war on terror" is, as many suspect,
entwined with our nation's quest for unrivaled global hegemony in the
service of managing a particular pax Americana global order. Because
the matter of global hegemony is off the jurisprudential table, as is the
precarious task of managing the pax Americana global order, the
that properly belong to the civil commitment arena. The deep theory behind that effort
was nicely stated by the legal theorist Henry Hart: "What distinguishes a criminal from a
civil sanction and all that distinguishes it ... is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition." Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).
241. See Williams, supra note 72.
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concession can be glossed over as if it were, indeed, a small matter. It
can be glossed over as if Guantanamo-the expression of sovereigntyas-power unshackled from legality-is simply a matter of Executive
discretion in wartime.
But the ontological/epistemological distinction cannot hold firm, as
the urgency that presumably motivates the ontological project of creating
a new category (enemy combatant) leads the Court to cut comers on the
epistemological project, which is to establish a set of procedures that,
one would think, is dedicated to promoting accurate classifications
within the ontological universe created by the Executive. What is
camouflaged in all this is the crucial observation that cutting comers on
the epistemological project, by virtue of the overwhelming power of the
combatants"), is actually the adding
ontological project (labeling "enemy
242
of more muscle to the sovereign.

The deep structure of Hamdi contains among its elements a
commitment to "the law of identity," which in formal logic posits a fixed
category for a concept-namely, that whatever is, is, and that, according
24 3
to logic's law of contradiction, that which is cannot be what it is not.
In Hamdi terms, one who is an enemy combatant cannot be other than an
enemy combatant, and since everything must either be or not be, the
world neatly divides into those who are enemy combatants and those
who are not. In the locution of President Bush, "[ejitheryou are with us,
or you are with the terrorists,' 244 which, in this "reduction of history to a
radical either-or," entails a "vision and reality of politics as perpetual
total war., 245 This deep structural commitment to formal logic's "law of
identity," which is foundational to Enlightenment's means-ends
fetishism-manifested most clearly in the rationalists penchant to divide
the world up into the observer and the observed, with philosophy serving
as a "mirror" on Nature2 46 -is foundational as well to classical legal

242. Every relaxation of an evidentiary prohibition that makes government detention
easier to accomplish is an expansion of sovereign power. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS
We see the opposite effect in capital punishment
OF EVIDENCE LAW (2005).
jurisprudence, where the ontology there of death-eligible and death-worthy individuals
provokes a risk-averse epistemology that generates what some have called a
jurisprudence of super-due process. That risk-averse epistemology is, in essence, the
weakening of sovereign power, or better yet, a limitation on its exercise.
243. See generally GEORG W.F. HEGEL, THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC (A.V. Miller trans.,
Allen & Unwin, London 1969).
244. Bush, supra note 12.

supra note 48, at 205.

245.

SHKLAR,

246.

See generally RICHARD RORTY,

PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE

(1979).
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reasoning and thus vital to law's functioning as a structuring system. But
the underside to that function is that it banishes complexity by hiding the
social and political order that defines the controversy in any genuinely
meaningful sense.
"Enemy combatant" both describes and condemns, in one blow,
without the unpleasantries of ambiguity.247 And it does so while denying
that those individuals who are adjudicated within this highly simplistic
ontological universe are social and historical figures. If we are a global
community, then enemy combatants act within it, and their subjectivity,
their beingness, is bound up with the goings-on in that global
community. But Hamdi's acceptance of the Executive's politically
tendentious ontology bespeaks the law's aspiration to deny the moral and
political complexity of all judgment. It denies the distributive nature of
judgment, that judgment necessarily must account for what the
"community" has done, how the community is complicit in the offending
act, as it condemns the individual offender. Judgment is always,
therefore, ambivalent. But, as in virtually every area of the law, except
here with more rigor, that ambivalence must be suppressed in this war on
terror.
The reason for this is clear: the simplistic juridical ontology of
"enemy combatants" in this war on terror removes from investigation,
and thus further solidifies, a geopolitical world order that itself may be
contributing to the very real threats posed by fanatical Islamists. After
all, who can rationally oppose neutralizing terrorists bent on destruction?
The question alone banishes from thought the difficult moral and
political issues that arise if we openly debated and in other ways
confronted the possibility (if not the undeniable reality) of our pursuit of
a pax Americana global order. As democratic theorist Benjamin Barber

247. "Enemy combatant" as an evaluative category threatens to problematize "enemy
combatant" as a descriptive category. This sort of tension pervades criminal law
doctrine. For example, defendant intends to kill (descriptive categorization) but the
existence of provocation that prompts the intent may compel us to calibrate that judgment
to bring legal judgment in line with moral evaluation (intent as an evaluative category).
Legal judgment wedded to a rigid ontology of intent and no-intent would look at the
provoked defendant abstractly, formalistically, as a stick figure. Though there are
pressures to stay firm with formalistic reasoning of this sort, we always feel the tug to
seek out a thicker picture of what happened. This may be due to our being moral
creatures. But regardless of why we feel drawn to thick descriptions of events, that
thicker picture always threatens to undercut the stability of the fixed category (in this
case, intent). Similarly, a thicker picture of what motivates so-called terroristsparticularly the home-grown variety like Padilla-and a thicker picture of what has
generated Islamic fundamentalism and the resulting war on terror, will necessarily
undercut the stability of the fixed category of enemy combatant. See Padilla v. Hanft,
423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005). Thick narratives are always at war with simplistic
ontologies.
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observes, Americans, with their optimism in technology, "can stand
uncomprehending in the face of putative evil, blind to the lessons of
mere national interest, certain of its own goodness, and thus intolerant of
complexity."' 2 48 This banishment of complexity is precisely what is at
stake in the Court's deference to the Executive's power of ontology.
And that deference to the Executive, which is beyond the formal logic on
which classical legal reasoning nourishes itself, illustrates how legal
reasoning is invested with disguised ideological power.
Mr. Hamdi's life, his reality, is a matter beyond the institutional
competence of the judiciary to reckon with. This narrative maneuver
suggests that accusing him of treason-Justices Scalia and Stevens's
position in dissent 249-which means giving Mr. Hamdi a trial and all the
procedural trappings of a trial, including significant legal rights that are
the run-up to the trial, would be too extravagant, too indulgent in this
Better, from a process-oriented jurisprudential
"difficult time."
standpoint, and better from the war-on-terror vantage point, to package
Mr. Hamdi's predicament as merely categorizing him as either an enemy
combatant or not. Categorization is a bureaucratic judgment, a part of
the means-ends regulatory process over which other branches of
government, not the judiciary, have primary concern.
No messy details about how exactly the United States knew the
Taliban regime supported Al Qaeda and how long it had that
information, let alone embarrassing facts about our financial support for
the Taliban and our role in Osama Bin Laden's rise to prominence within
the terror network of Al Qaeda. 250 As in all legal analysis, the messy
details are pushed aside--off-stage so to speak-to clear away a
narrative path that gives the analysis, and thus by extension the law itself,
the authority of inevitability. This is a standard rhetorical technique,
deployed always in law, whether in litigation or in judicial opinionwriting. Narratives must perforce ascend and descend the ladder of the
abstract and the concrete. The real interpretive question is, for what
purpose? As the discussion that follows reveals, keeping the rhetoric
from descending the ladder down into the concrete is essential to keeping
intact some powerful givens, myths, about this country's response to
9/11. And more particularly, keeping the locutions abstract does what all
rhetorical strategies aim to do: give the outcome an air of inevitability.
Outcome here is not the details about legal process, but the imprimatur
on the Executive's power to "deem" a "detainee" an "enemy combatant."
The deployment of abstract rhetoric rather than concrete descriptions and
248. See BARBER, supra note 6, at 66.
249.
250.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004).
See generally LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING

TOWER

(Vintage 2007).
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investigation give those quoted words an ontological naturalness that
serve only to suppress hard questions about what is happening in this
country, and to the soul of this country, since 9/11, and for over a half
century before the Towers fell. In fact, the entire narrative construction
of Hamdi-and this goes for the concurring and dissenting opinions,
too-projects onto the interpretive canvass an ontological universe that
must be questioned if we are to pursue any path to global peace and
justice. Central in that ontology is the trenchant and apocryphal vision of
"America" as intrinsically a beneficent force in the world, acting "as the
vanguard of history," projecting its own hyper-power globally with no
genuinely hegemonic ambitions of its own, at least none not infused with
the idealized Wilsonian ambition to see "democracy" flourish. 25' And
for its beneficence it has suffered uniquely, and must hereafter endure
virtually certain future attacks from fanatics ("evildoers") whose
existence has absolutely no connection to our own, as if their status as
our current nemesis simply happened, for no apparent reason. It is an
ontology where people like Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla (another socalled enemy combatant) are "missiles of destruction," akin to people
who are carrying highly contagious viruses and thus must be summarily
detained, lest innocent people be killed.2 52
This latter ontological enterprise, of categorizing individuals as so
irredeemably dangerous that they ought be detained just as we would
without hesitation administratively detain against their will viruscarrying persons who are so contagious that they threaten the lives of
many innocents, seems perfectly apt for the Hamdi situation. It may be
that lurking underneath the legalistic rhetoric is the belief that Islamic
terrorists are public-health threats in exactly the same way that
contagious virus-carrying persons are threats.2 53 Since no one suggests
251. BACEVICH, supra note 6, at 215 (emphasis omitted).
252. The imagery of disease attached to those whom we confine in the name of social
order is hardly new. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A
HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 205 (Vintage 1988) (1965). Nor is it new
when it comes to characterizing our geo-political enemies. Cold Warriors spoke of the
"disease" of communism and the need to "immunize" Third World populations against
being infected by it. GADDIS, supra note 152, at 223. In retrospect, we can plainly see
that the imagery served to mask the U.S. effort to organize the world in a way congenial
to our own narrow interests. But getting back to our present day, it turns out that a faith
in the Executive Branch's ability to identify who is in fact a "missile of destruction"
would have been misplaced, as neither Hamdi nor Padilla were held much longer as
"enemy combatants" or "terrorists" after the Supreme Court rejected the Executive's
claim of unfettered authority to indefinitely detain such persons. See Dahlia Lithwick,
Nevermind, Hamdi Wasn't So Bad After All, SLATE, Sept. 23, 2004,
http://slate.com/id/2107114; Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005).
253. Some regard Islamic terrorism as an attack on our body politic's immune system,
causing us to attack ourselves. See, e.g., BORRADORI, supra note 211, at 94-124 (showing
Derrida's view); BARBER, supra note 6, at 24 ("[T]he terrorist's primary job (as with an
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that quarantining for public health reasons requires an obstacle course of
due process that we associate with criminal adjudication, we ought not
obsess over due process when it comes to Islamic terrorists. Perhaps the
ideology of the Islamic terrorist is so poisonous that we ought to treat
him as infected, ideologically infected; and accordingly, the Islamic
terrorist may be dispatched more or less summarily as part of what
Foucault terms the "bio-power"
of the sovereign, a power characterized
25 4
by the goal to "foster life.
It is not beyond comprehension to understand Islamic
fundamentalists who are willing to "martyr" themselves in a way that
will kill thousands, even millions, of non-combatant Americans as
infected with a deranged ideology that literally impels them to kill.255
Captured in this imagery is the geopolitical fact that our "enemies" are
no longer just pawns for warring sovereigns. They are "killing
machines," killers who "represent, as it were, an equivocation of the
human, which forms the basis for some of the skepticism about the
applicability of legal entitlements and protections. ' 256 We may hesitate
to use the word "illness," but the idea that terrorists suffer some psychic
malfunction that renders them killing machines is not an alien notion.2 57
In fact, the image of "terrorists" with an unhinged propensity to kill is
quite useful, for it blots out any portrayal that what threatens us has a
infectious agent) is merely to initiate the contagion. The contaminated body's immune
system does the rest as the body struggles to neutralize the infection by making war on its
own infected systems.").
254. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 140 (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1980) (1976). Lee Harris of the Hoover Institute argues
that "our enemy" ought not be regarded as human beings, as they have "already
dehumanized" themselves, but should be treated "in the same manner that you would deal
with a fatal epidemic-you try to wipe it out." Lee Harris, Al Qaeda'sFantasyIdeology:
War without Clausewitz, 114 POL'Y REV. 34-35 (Aug. and Sept. 2002). For an extended
discussion of the thesis that there is a project to demonize Muslims and Islam, including
within the academy, see Liaquat Ali Khan, The EssentialistTerrorist,45 WASHBURN L.J.
47 (2005).
255. Cf Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that executive detention may be justified to remove human "missiles of
destruction").
256. BUTLER, supra note 44, at 73-74 (characterizing the views of former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld).
257. There are many problems with pursuing this path, not all of them analytical,
epistemological, or metaphysical. There is the sheer political incendiariness of it. It
broaches the one taboo of this "difficult time:" making it a time where the West is
fighting Islam itself, where Islamic fundamentalism is treated as the virus that produces
the unhinged propensity to kill. Making explicit that the "status" question rests on
presuppositions about dangerousness rooted in a state of being infected by the Koran
would, most would agree, make this "difficult time" much, much worse-politically
speaking. And so we are left with the fact that the "status" question rests on what Hamdi
allegedly did, and what he allegedly did undoubtedly arouses "community
condemnation" of the sort that has long justified criminal punishment.
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political, economic, and cultural dimension.
B.

War and Terrorism

In Hamdi's heartland of Legality, the AUMF, the legislative act
supposedly authorizing executive detention, we get the first mention of
the word, "war," the rhetorical key to unchaining ourselves from the
conceptual lock that blaming and condemnation poses for an
Enlightenment culture.258 Understanding the geopolitical ramifications
of defining "terrorism" allows us to see why Bruce Ackerman's logically
correct critique of the war-on-terror locution-that it makes no sense to
make war on a technique-misses the essential point behind the
phrase. 259 The Ackerman critique treats the phrase too literally, gives the
sovereign too much credit. That phrasing is no longer preposterous if we
decode it through the prism of U.S. global ambition. "Terrorism" may
be a technique, but in this war-on-terrorframe, the locution "terrorism"
is purely conceptual, an abstraction that refers not to a technique but to
an intrusion and barrier. "Terrorism" is an intrusion into, a rupture of, a
bedrock feature of American exceptionalism in which we are a nation
that ought to be immune from the violence and suffering that daily arises
within other regions of the world. It is also a barrier, a threat, to a
particular vision of a globally managed world order held together by a
sole superpower's military might. That vision is no secret; it is on
display in the 2002 National Security Strategy document.26 °
And therein lays the true reason the practitioners of the so-called
Islamic terrorism we are now battling are not regarded as "criminals," as
if that category had some genuine metaphysical bite. It is not what the
258. The concept of war is in our Constitution, but the Supreme Court has never
defined it as a legal term, even though a legal controversy has occasionally arisen that
seemingly demanded some juridical understanding of the term. See EDWARD KEYNES,
UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 84 (2d ed. 1991).

If

violence and barbarity is something we need to do, even love to do, then we need to find
some mechanism to regulate that behavior. See CHRIS HEDGES, WAR IS A FORCE THAT
GIvES Us MEANING 88-89 (2002). The first step to regulation is to create a category for
it. Hence the category of war. "War," in its most potent sense, is not a descriptive word,
a way of characterizing a state of affairs. It is often used descriptively, but that function
is epiphenomenal. "War" is not a circumstance, but a speech-act, an expression by the
Sovereign that power must be exerted. It is an expression of expanded sovereignty by an
announcement that a certain state of affairs shall exist. "War" creates rather than
describes. When a leader says that we are at "war," he is not describing; he is bringing
into being a mode of activity, a practice infused with a power that itself constitutes what
we mean by sovereignty. The expression of legality through war, then, is an expression
of the increased discretion state actors have. "War" as a descriptive term, in its
epiphenomenal function, is but an artifact of some earlier authoritative announcement
that brings into being that which we are supposedly describing.
259. See ACKERMAN, supra note 15, at 13.
260.

See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 6.
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9/11 hijackers did that is the focus, for that retrospection would draw us
to categorizing those perpetrators as "criminals" and thus compel our
adherence to the obstacle course of due process. It is what we as a nation
want to pursue that drives the ontology of our post-9/1 1 era. Islamic
terrorists are categorized as something other than "criminals" because
their actions are significant precisely in how they intrude on America's
global ambitions. That means they must be conceptualized within the
coded rhetoric of "national security," and thus susceptible to vanquishing
through military means.26 1
And so, understanding the war on terror through a geopolitical pax
Americana prism, rather than through a physical-security/self-defense
framework (which is how our government conveniently presents it, so as
to promote fear in the populace, and thus to keep off the table issues that
dominate the discussion in other nations when it comes to the war on
terror, issues regarding U.S. global ambitions), allows us to see that
"[t]he root of our problem is not Islam or any ideology, but a
fundamental change in the relationship between the state, the market, and
technologies of destruction., 262 The war on terror is a war to recapture
the monopoly on violence that nation-states have long assumed to be
their prerogative. And no nation-state has more of an interest in that
monopoly than the sole global superpower, for management of a world
order can only take place in a world where the capacity for massive
destruction is kept in the hands of a few "trusted," deterrable
governments.

Hamdi forces the reckoning with what it means to be at "war" by
raising the specter of "indefinite" detention.263 The specter of indefinite
detention surfaces because the distinguishing feature of our enemy
makes indefinite detention potentially necessary. Specifically, within the
label of war and the specter of indefinite detention is the slippery idea of
261. See, e.g., Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the
Perpetratorsor Their Commanders as An Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the
State's Duty to Protect Its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 195, 213-14 (2001);

Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. SoIf Lecture in InternationalLaw:
Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defence, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1989). For
an excellent debunking of the contention that Al Qaeda and the Islamists hate and attack
us for "who we are" as opposed to what we do with our economic and military power, see
MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST Is LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR

(2004).
262. ACKERMAN, supra note 15, at 14. This theme of the state's loss of monopolizing

the power to inflict mass killing is a recurrent one in our post-9/1 1 age. See
supra note 11, at 30-33.
263. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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So much ink has been spilled in an effort to define the term,
as if it were a lexical exercise as opposed to an investigation into
realpolitik,265 and yet we lose sight of the fact that the essential difficulty
here is articulating what is distinctive about terrorism that is not under
266
inclusive but at the same time does not indict our own foreign policy.
That task-exempting ourselves from a condemnation we would like to
attach to others-ultimately renders "terror" and "terrorism" nonconcepts, words that manipulate rather than carry a genuine cargo of
meaning calculated to rationally persuade.26 7 The prospect of perpetual
cannot be disentangled
war, and the concomitant indefinite detention,
268
from the conundrum of defining "terrorism.
terrorism.

264. See id. at 519-20.
265. See, e.g., Virginia Held, Terrorism, Rights and Political Goals, in VIOLENCE,
TERRORISM AND JUSTICE 59-85 (R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991); C.A.J.
Coady, The Morality of Terrorism, 60 PHIL. 47, 47-70 (1985).
266. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at 17 ("The problem" with defining terrorism
"is that [the definitions] vary according to who defines their key elements....
Depending on who defines these elements, of course, even the United States could be
labeled a terrorist state."). See also Michael Jordon, Terrorism's Slippery Definition
Eludes UN Diplomats, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 3, 2002 at 7. The modem notion
of "terrorism" comes not from rogue activity by relatively powerless groups seeking to
destabilize established regimes, but from the French Revolution where the State used
terror to solidify its power. See Michael Baur, What is Distinctive about Terrorism, and
What are the PhilosophicalImplications, in PHILOSOPHY 9/11: THINKING ABOUT THE WAR
ON TERRORISM 4 (Timothy Shanahan ed., 2005) (using terror as a political weapon in the
service of the State, in fact, is the most common form of terrorism, however we choose to
define the term).
267. See generally Scott Atran, Genesis of Suicide Terrorism, 299 SCI. 1534 (March
7, 2003). Excluding us and including Al Qaeda also demands that the definition not get
mired in the freedom fighter-terrorism distinction: one man's terrorist is another man's
freedom fighter. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107 (2d Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 933 (2003) ("there continues to be strenuous disagreement among States
about what actions do or do not constitute terrorism, nor have we shaken ourselves free of
the cliche that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"') (citation omitted).
268. It is worth dwelling, for a moment, on the phraseology bequeathed to us by 9/11,
namely, the phrase "war on terror." On seems apt in that "terror" is a feeling and feelings
do not fight back. We are not locked in a battle between us and terror. Our wars on
poverty and drugs were not wars between us and those things. They were wars on those
things, meaning we were on a mission to eradicate them. We go to war on something
because that something is intrinsically bad, something to which we cannot be reconciled:
the thing on which we go to war cannot be made good through the act of war. The war
on those things presupposes that the goal is their eradication. It is thus significant that we
have characterized Al Qaeda as having launched a war on freedom, for that implies that
their "war" is akin to ours-the only goal is eradication. We can never be reconciled to
terrorism and they can never be reconciled to freedom. The endgame is not a peace
treaty-World War II was a war between us and Germany, where the endgame was a
peace treaty with Germany, not the eradication of Germany-but is instead the stamping
out of the other, so long as the other remains the embodiment of the thing on which the
war is fought. The lexical problem here is that terrorism is not intrinsically bad. It is a
descriptive term of a tactic that, in its current parlance, has taken on an evaluative force to
obscure what may actually be taking place and what Legality may be unwittingly, or
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All this lurks beneath O'Connor's characterization that this is "an
unconventional" war.269 She says the Court "recognize[s] ... the
national security underpinnings of the 'war on terror"' but never
elaborates what those underpinnings are. 2 70 That failure to elaborate
serves a function in this narrative, for what allows the decision to hang
together, to cohere as a legal document, is the invisible background
storyline of American exceptionalism. The glue keeping intact the entire
narrative structure is the national mythos that we as a nation could not be
other than a benevolent force in the world-this is a definitional matter,
and thus immune from any factual critique, of which there are too many
to mention-and that Islamic terrorists have arisen virtually out of
nowhere to victimize us. 271 Because this storyline is definitional rather
than empirical, most Americans find it almost impossible to escape, to
critique.2 72 Most of the world is outside its grip, and thus most of the
world's inhabitants are open to understanding our global predicament273of
intensified and disbursed violence as a burgeoning "global civil war.,
This difference in consciousness about our pursuit of empire and the
wittingly, supporting.
269. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004). O'Connor is quite aware that the
elasticity of the notion of war makes it hard to tell what limits there are to an Executive's
power to "deem" a group of people unlawful enemy combatants subject to indefinite
detention. Id. at 517. Although that power is linked to the Executive's role in
prosecuting a war, the opinion is openly wary of the elasticity of that notion. See id. at
517-539. Perhaps that wariness explains the plurality's search for a process that
seemingly accepts the criminal adjudicatory process as the baseline, the norm from which
we may depart, if our democratic institutions (notably, Congress) determine that
compelling circumstances warrant it. See id.
270. Id. at 520.
271. See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 308 ("[Albsolutely verboten [in the 2004
presidential election campaigns] was the one thing everybody in the world seems to
understand but us: that 9/11 was the blowback from an interventionist foreign policy.").
272. See supra notes 73. See also BARBER, supra note 6, at 59 ("[M]ost Americans,
moved by exceptionalism, [understand America's actions] ... as rooted in virtue and
justified by America's core 'decency' and commitment to liberal democracy" and thus do
not see how our rhetoric masks our "global ambitions."); id. at 100 ("America's inability
to see its own motives ...is why it is often viewed as arrogant even by its friends and
allies.").
273. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 7, at 8. The Hamdi Court's analysis
understands the current global situation as exceptional, which implies that the way we
have experienced warfare up until now still holds sway. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 519-21.
But the concept of warfare as "interstate conflict is less and less viable today given the
emergence of innumerable global civil wars" and the emergence of a "new sovereignty, a
global Empire." HARDT AND NEGRI, supra note 7, at 7. The upshot is that the so-called
state of exception is not an exception at all, but is a permanent condition. Id. How might
the Court's analytical orientation have changed had it operated with a more awakened
consciousness about this geopolitical situation we have actually produced? There is, of
course, no way to answer that question, though O'Connor timidly nods her
acknowledgment at the possibility of having to juridically confront this fact. See Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 438-39.
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resulting blowback arising from it probably explains why most of the
world is dubious of our foreign-policy maneuvers and why many regard
the U.S. as the most potent threat to world peace. If the real nationalsecurity underpinnings to this "war on terror" are linked to a pax
Americana pursuit, then the sacrificing of our basic values that undergird
our one-time understanding of due process for the sake of this "war" is a
sly bait-and-switch, and Legality becomes complicit in it. Of course,
none of this can really be played out either in the Hamdi decision or in
public discourse generally, because the idea of American
exceptionalism-the mythology at the core of Wilsonian idealism, an
idealism that is the lifeblood of the neo-conservative foreign policy that
we have disastrously pursued since 9/1 127 4-has sunk too deep into the
American psyche.2 75 We can as a nation no more see ourselves as
aggressors on the world stage than we could see ourselves as aggressors
against the Native Americans during our quest for westward expansion.
And so we reflexively understand Guantanamo-style detention as a
reaction to the problem of terrorism, even if we object to it on legalistic,
humanistic, or other grounds. It strikes us as beyond comprehension to
see it as anything but an appendage (misguided or not) to the larger
struggle to overcome "terrorism." What we cannot do is consider the
converse, see the so-called war on terror as an ingredient, as in the
service of, Guantanamo (the resurgence of a form of sovereignty long
past but never fully overcome), see the construction of Islamic
"terrorism" in the public mind as an ingredient in the development of a
detention practice that suits the homogenizing of a global populace
aimed at the production of consumers and bare-life laborers, denuded of
tradition and culture. In that sense, Hamdi conceals its own perhaps
unwitting complicity with a vision of pax Americana-style globalization,
a vision so plainly visible that we Americans can hardly see it.
VIII.Freud, Modernity, and Some Concluding Thoughts on Legality and
Violence
Every ten years or so, the U.S. needs to pick up some crappy little
country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean
business.
Michael Ledeen, holder of the "Freedom
2 76
Chair" at the American Enterprise Institute

274.
275.
276.

See generally FRUM & PERLE, supra note 14.
See generally BACEVICH, supra note 6.
BOAL ET AL., supra note 11, at 103.
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Freud identified two competing impulses in the human psyche, Eros
and Thanatos, which constantly threaten to collapse into one another.27 7
This struggle between the life and death instincts within each individual
replicates itself in civilizations and thus produces in humanity a deeply
embedded and ineradicable unhappiness, or as Freud put it, a
"discontent."' 278 Freud's darkly pessimistic outlook percolated out of a
dark time, the aftermath of an irrational bloodbath that soaked the
European Continent and during the rumblings that foreshadowed the next
world war. Though Freud's pessimism captured a global moodCivilization and Its Discontents279 was an international bestseller and
provoked intense debate-the fact that Freud's thinking was the
culmination of an Enlightenment epoch seemed to go unnoticed.
In Freud we see an aggressive rationality, a form of relentless
analysis that drills into the depths of the mind, the very tool of rationality
itself; Freud's monumental achievement is this phenomenon of
rationality turned back on itself, boldly attacking the hubris within our
own claim to rationality. That is, the Enlightenment project, by the time
Freud inherited it, led to an exploration into the unconscious in an effort
to understand ourselves in a way that shocked and fascinated us, for it
was precisely this aggressive rationality that unveiled what lay beneath
itself-a disturbing cauldron of irrationality that swirls beneath the thin
patina of rationality, which we experience as civilized engagement. 280 It
is useful to take stock of this under-appreciated facet of Freud's thinking,
for we may suffer the illusion that the social world is rational, and thus
conducive to human freedom, when in fact it may be deeply irrational,
with human beings frighteningly amenable to manipulation by overt and
subtle propagandistic machinations that serve the very narrow interests
of the powerful and the privileged. As astonishing as it may be to see
how successful such manipulation has been in places like Nazi Germany
and modern-day North Korea, it may be more vital, given our current
difficulties with terrorism, to be open to how amenable to propagandistic
manipulation is a populace of passive consumers who have lost their

277. See FREUD, supra note 75; HEDGES, supra note 258, at 157-60.
278. See FREUD,supranote 75, at 86-91.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 70-80. Freud, of course, was not the first to dethrone Reason by
situating it within a larger frame of reference. Hegel took issue with Kant's trumpeting
of Reason as prior to all else, as the fundamental building block of culture and historical
progress. See GEORG W. F.. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford
University Press 1967). Reason, Hegel argued, is not a feature of the autonomous self, as
Kant claimed. Rather, it is itself a feature of history, a product of man's particular
placement within a particular time and place. So, Freud and Hegel-and we should add
Marx as well-object to the liberal idea of Reason as a feature of human autonomy,
treating that idea as a cultural illusion.
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self-identity as citizens. Being open to that possibility has deep
implications for our current war-on-terror jurisprudence, and more
generally, for the so-called security-liberty28balance that occupies so
much of our attention in this era of terrorism. 1
The animating idea here is the possibility that American democracy
itself is threatened more profoundly than we care to admit to ourselves
with the irrationality that Freud's work gestures at, that there is a dark
side to the Enlightenment, an aspect of "rationality" operating within a
framework of irrationality that ought seize our conscience as being itself
dangerous and threatening to our flourishing, if not our very survival.
Strip away the mythic nationalistic rhetoric that cloaks our high-school
history texts and you see the dark side of the Enlightenment at play in
virtually all phases of our national life. 282 As philosopher Albert
Borgmann puts it in describing an earlier quest for empire, "[n]othing
could stand in the way of the aggressive advance of the railroad, not the
claims of the Native Americans, nor the resistance of nature, nor the
dissoluteness and the distress of humans. 283 Jiirgen Habermas updates
Borgmann's observation to our post-9/1 1 age: "[i]n the fear driving the
technologically heavily armed superpower [the United States], one can
sense the 'Cartesian anxiety' of a subject who tries to objectify both itself
and the world around it in an effort to bring everything under control. 284
Rationality produced the marvels of science and the explosion of
technological prowess because, as an extraordinarily powerful tool,
rationality equips the human species with the ability to control and
dominate ever-increasing domains of Nature-ultimately to accomplish
Rene Descartes' dream, where we have "render[ed] ourselves the lords
and possessors of nature. ''285 Unfettered rationality brings on the hubris
that, given time, all of Nature can be subdued by human ingenuity and

281. See generally Williams, supra note 72. The connection between our consumerist
society and the Hamdi opinion is a matter I explore more directly in the second part of
this two-part series.
282. MACINTYRE, supra note 104, at 109.
283. BORGMANN, supra note 201, at 32.

For a profound confrontation with the
violence immanent in the American experience and its particular form of rationality, with
its deep emphasis on control and domination, we could hardly do better than read, in
tandem, Herman Melville's Moby Dick, Cormac McCarthy's Blood Meridian, and (most
profoundly) William Faulkner's Absolom, Absolom-novels that are distinctively
American (meaning that it would be unthinkable that such works could have arisen in any
other culture) and, when taken together, shatteringly powerful in exposing who we are as
a nation. See also BARBER, supra note 6, at 49, 52-55 (discussing Melville's Billy Budd
and Benito Cereno).
284. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 33.
285.

RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD 49 (Ernest Rhys ed., John Veitch

trans., J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1934) (1637). See, PANGLE, supra note 94, at 3 ("At the
heart of modernity is the trust or faith in scientific reason ...").
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determination. 286 It is precisely this gold-rush drive to probe the deepest
28 7
mysteries of Nature-a drive that is distinctive to modernity itself that has led humanity to live on the brink of annihilation since the 1950s,
with the onset of the Atomic Age. It is precisely the triumph of
rationality, with its means-ends ideology, that has led to an ecological
crisis that threatens the habitability of the planet. It is all this that made it
at one time (when many of us were school children) sickeningly
"rational" to speak of building cozy bomb shelters into which we might
The dark side of the
retreat in the event of a nuclear attack.
Enlightenment is essentially the cult of rationality,2 8 8 and it is worth
putting on the table for discussion, as we forge deeper into the darkness
that we call the war on terror, that this cult of rationality is a source of
the greatest violence in the world and is what most threatens humanity.28 9
What does all this have to do with Hamdi and the questioning of our
commitment to trial by jury as a vitalizing (not just vital) feature of our
Enlightenment heritage? The answer lies in the suggestion that the
current ambivalence we are experiencing over the parameters of trial by
jury-should it be jettisoned when it comes to the so-called war on
terror?-is symptomatic of the larger ambivalence we have over
modernity. That is, the issue of bracketing or suspending trial by jury
when it comes to terrorists is, I submit, a manifestation of our temptation
to surrender ourselves completely to a form of rationality, a form of
means-ends thinking, that threatens to destroy us.290
Means-ends rationality, and the discourse associated with such
instrumental modes of thought, is the medium through which the
security-liberty balance juridically expresses itself.291 But instrumental
reasoning is tempered in a democracy by the fact that the state must
always justify itself so that coercion gets transmuted into consent. It has
long been thought, especially after Kant hit the scene, that the
286. See generally, HELD, supra note 77, at 148-56, 167-68, 205; UNGER, supra note
32, at 162.
287. See BORGMANN, supra note 201, at 2-6; PANGLE, supra note 94, at 3; WILLIAM
LEIss, THE DOMINATION OF NATURE 57-61 (1972). See generally FRANCIS BACON, THE
GREAT INSTAURATION AND NEW ATLANTIS ( Jerry Weinberger ed., 1980). Borgmann

suggests that we understand modernity as "the conjunction of Bacon's, Descartes's, and
Locke's projects, as the fusion of the domination of nature with the primacy of method
and the sovereignty of the individual." BORGMANN, supra note 201, at 25. I would add
to Borgmann's list, and emphasize much more, the contribution of Kant's universalism,
since that contribution is so vital to our Western conception of human rights and the
philosophical foundation of our commitment to a particular adjudicatory method. See
also HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 118-32.
288. See generally HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 77.
289. HELD, supra note 77, at 163.
290. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
291. See Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 16, at 164.
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justification of state power in a democracy cannot be rooted in naked
instrumental reasoning. 292
In times of relative calm and social stability, these competing
impulses for security and justification find some calibrated equilibrium.
Calibrating the proper balance between these two impulses is but a single
manifestation-probably the most urgent manifestation--of a larger,
overarching calibration that takes place in an Enlightenment-driven
culture. Modernity's retreat in the face of what has been called postmodernism is in no small measure an expression of our culture's growing
"disenchantment" with instrumental reasoning as the governing
framework for navigating through life. 293 This grand-scale calibration of
instrumental reasoning's reach within a culture is largely invisible to
most people, taking place in the rarified arenas of the arts. In the realm
of criminal justice and national security, the calibration is ongoing,
usually minor and technical, perhaps provoking blistering critique and
debate among specialists but largely ignored by the public at large. But
enter into our lives a destabilizing event, one that provokes social
instability, such as the 9/11 attacks, and this calibration becomes a top
priority within mainstream culture.294
Calibrating the competing impulses of security and justification is
experienced through governmentality, through the workings of
administrative agencies populated with bureaucrats and through the
operation of our courts, and most obviously through the processes of
criminal-law adjudication.2 95 But what that calibration expresses is not
so prosaic. Sovereignty itself exists through these competing impulses,
just as the human species exists, expresses itself, as Freud encapsulates
it, through the competing impulses of Eros and Thanatos. That means,
when in times of crisis we undergo an angst over how best to calibrate

292. The security and justificatory impulses might be understood as competing
impulses because satisfying the former (the security impulse) is often made easier by
sacrificing the latter (the justificatory impulse). Herbert Packer gestured at this idea
when he identified the two models of criminal procedure, the Crime Control Model and
the Due Process Model, and characterized them as akin to an assembly line and an
obstacle course. See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73
(1968). For one theorist's deployment of competing impulses to understand history, see
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 133-249 (1960) (regarding history as the
competition between healthy instincts of society and the destructive power drives of the
state).
293. I put disenchantment in quotes to signal my wish to evoke Max Weber's
hypothesis that within our Enlightenment heritage is the corrosive impulse to resort to
instrumentalist modes of thought and action. See BORRADORI, supra note 211, at 69-70.
See also MACINTYRE, supra note 104, at 109-11.

294. See Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 16, at 161.
295. See id. at 165-94. See also BUTLER, supra note 44, at 51-56 (discussing the
operation of govemmentality).
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the impulses for security and justification-commonly spoken of as the
tension between security and civil liberties-and when that calibration
leads to a renewed priority for security and a submerging of our impulse
for justifying state power through non-instrumental
modes of thought, we
296
are witnessing a surge in sovereignty itself.
Though it may appear to be a surging of a new kind of sovereignty,
what we are witnessing is actually the resurrection of one that is quite
old. Once we understand that the Western quest for control and
domination of nature, culminating in Freud's rationalistic investigation
into the very source of rationality itself (human consciousness), unveiled
a cauldron of desires and impulses and drives-that is, once. we
understand that rationality unveiled a vast, dark wellspring of
irrationality-then we can appreciate that the quest for control and
domination ultimately unveils the folly of the quest itself. And so it is
perhaps with America in this post-9/l 1 age of fear. The Western drive to
control and dominate the globe has now led to a mode of free-market
globalization that threatens to obliterate cultural diversity and reduce the
world's peoples to passive consumers who have nothing else to offer
except their labor. But what that quest for empire has unveiled is
something akin to what Freud discovered, that the pursuit of a stable and
supposedly rational global order managed by the military force of a sole
global hegemon ultimately exposes another vast and dark wellspring of
irrationality, manifesting as a cycle of violence, nihilistic violence of the
so-called terrorists and the vengeful violence of the superpower
committed to stamping out whatever may impede the quest for control
and dominance. And on the micro level, what legality has produced in
Hamdi-what supposedly apolitical legal rationality has spawned-is a
form of sovereignty that reverts us back to a pre-Enlightenment moment
when sovereignty was indivisible and expressed itself ultimately in its
capacity to use violence outside any juridical framework. The very thing
296. The surge in sovereignty, as I understand it here, is not the expansion of state
power to eclipse the rule of law. That view is too easily refuted-after all, the Hamdi
opinion is devoted to protecting the rule of law-and thus can be propped up as a
strawman position to silence those who worry about the deep cultural and socio-political
repercussions of cases like Hamdi. The expansion of sovereignty occurs through the ever
widening dispersal of instrumental reasoning that characterizes bureaucratic thinking and
action. Judith Butler observes that our resort to indefinite detention occurs "through an
elaboration of administrative bureaucracies in which officials now not only decide who
will be tried, and who will be detained, but also have ultimate say over whether someone
may be detained indefinitely or not." BUTLER, supra note 44, at 51. While I do not agree
with Butler that our war-on-terror-inspired indefinite-detention policy reflects a
"suspension" of the rule of law, my reading of Hamdi has been influenced by her thesis
that "because our historical situation is marked by govemmentality, and this implies, to a
certain degree, a loss of sovereignty, that loss is compensated through the resurgence of
sovereignty within the field of governmentality." Id. at 56.
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that our Enlightenment heritage bequeathed us, Legality, has driven us
back into that unveiled cauldron of irrational violence.

